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I.

INTRODUCTION

Human experimentation can be broadly defined as anything done
to an individual to learn how it will affect him.' Its main objective is the
acquisition of new scientific knowledge rather than therapy. If an experiment is ultimately beneficial to others or even to the subject himself,
this does not mean that therapy served an important purpose. 2 There
are three distinguishable types of cases involving the treatment of
human subjects. The first is traditional treatment which uses normal
and approved methods and techniques for therapeutic purposes. The
second is research treatment, which means that a sick person is treated
with new methods and techniques primarily for therapeutic purposes.
This is sometimes called therapeutic experimentation. The third is re* Professor of Law, DePaul University College of Law; Secretary General, International
Association of Penal Law, Paris; Dean, International Institute of Higher Studies in Criminal
Sciences, Siracusa, Italy. S.J.D., George Washington Law Center, 1973; LL.M., John Marshall Law Institute, 1966; J.D., Indiana University, 1964. The article was written with the
assistance of Thomas G. Baffes and John T. Evrard.
** Chairman, Dep't of Surgery Mount Sinai Hospital; Lecturer in Law, DePaul University. LL.M. (1980), J.D. (1975), DePaul University College of Law; M.D., Tulane University
Medical School, 1945; B.S., Tulane University, 1943.
*** Assistant to Professor Bassiouni. J.D., DePaul University College of Law, 1980; M.A.,
University of Chicago, 1971; B.A., University of Illinois, 1970.
1 Bowker, Experiamenation on Humans and Gi)?r of Tissue: Artide 20-23 ofthe Civil Code, 19
McGILL L.J. 161, 164 (1973).
2 Id.
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search which consists of treating individuals with new procedures and
drugs for purely scientific purposes. This may be labelled "research
experimentation. "3
If medical progress were to depend solely upon the scientific byproduct of experimentation conducted incidental to therapy, medical
science and human health care might, figuratively, still be in the dark
ages. Throughout medical history, research experimentation has played
a central role in the development of knowledge which is beneficial to
human health. The influence of human experimentation permeates not
only medicine and the other biological sciences but also behavioral, sociological, political, economic, and military endeavors. Because human
experimentation deals with effects upon large numbers of people, experimenters possess the potential to enhance or diminish the welfare of mankind.4 Since this potential may result in willful, reckless or inadvertent
acts harmful to human beings, human experimentation is also a proper
concern for the international criminologist. Moreover, because of the
focus upon individual conduct rather than state action, experimentation
creates relatively neutral political concerns so that sovereign nations can
meet without fear of retaliation or loss of power and reasonably expect
to reach agreement on regulatory schemes. The prospects for success are
important in our time, when international policy-makers find themselves with inadequate measures to implement and enforce international
laws. 5 Since mutual agreement among sovereign nations is necessary to
secure enforcement, the potential for international cooperation in
human experimentation must be fully explored. In this manner adequate measures can be developed to protect human subjects from abuse.

II. HISTORICAL SURVEY OF HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION
The history of human experimentation dates to some of the oldest
writings on earth. The effects of innoculation were studied by the Chinese of the Sung Dynasty in 590 B.C. and were recorded in a Sanskrit
text, studied in India in the second and third centuries A.D. 6 The prac3 Giesen, Civil Liability of Physiciansfor New Methods of Treatment and Experimentation, 25
INT'L & CoMP. L. Q. 180, 188 (1976).
4 See general4y L. CLENDENING, SOURCE BOOK OF MEDICAL HISTORY (1960); F. GARRISON, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY OF MEDICINE (1913).
5 See Mueller & Besharov, The Existence of InternationalCriminalLaw and Its Evolution to the
Point ofIts Enforcement Crisis, in 1 A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 1 (M. C.
Bassiouni & V. Nanda, ed. 1973) [hereinafter referred to as INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW].
There is increasing recognition of the need to expand and strengthen the international regulation of human experimentation by means of a convention in the form of existing human
rights conventions. See Schwarzenberg, Pour an Code Internationalde Deontologie Medicale, Le
Monde, June 14, 1979, at 8, col. 4. See notes 327-29 & accompanying text injfa.
6 Bollet, Smalox: The Biography of a Disease-I,RESIDENT AND STAFF PHYSICIAN, Aug.
1978, at 47, 48.
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tice in ancient Persia was for the king to consign condemned criminals
to scientific experimentation. The Ptolemies permitted this practice in
Egypt, and it existed in Renaissance Pisa. 7 When Hippocrates asserted
that epilepsy is not an act of divine intervention but an ordinary disease,
he set the stage for the study of neurology and mental disease. 8 Galen
stressed experimentation in conjunction with observation, formalizing
medical experimentation in Western society about 1800 years ago. 9
Harvey's dominance in the seventeenth century supplanted the earlier
dominance of Galen. In particular, Harvey carried out controlled experiments on animals and man in order to demonstrate that blood circulates through the heart and lungs.' 0
The number and diversity of experiments on human subjects has
accelerated since the mid-eighteenth century. Some of the more noteworthy examples are: Lind's highly controlled study in 1757 demonstrating that citrus fruits cure scurvy; Jenner's publication in 1798 of
experimental results showing the value of vaccination against smallpox;
Davy's beautifully planned studies in 1799, giving rise to modern anesthesia, which was followed, after much controversy, by Morton's first
public demonstration of anesthesia in 1846; 11 Pasteur's discovery that
inoculation with attenuated rabies virus induced immunity to bites from
rabid animals; I2 and Korotkoff's studies in 1905 which measured arterial blood pressure. 13 The zeal to acquire new knowledge often
prompted the experimenter to use himself as subject, sometimes with
severe results. For example, in 1767 John Hunter inoculated himself
with the pus of gonorrhea to prove that the disease is transmissable. He
succeeded but also contracted syphilis from the inoculation. Walter
Reed subjected himself to the effects of yellow fever virus in order to
discover the manner in which it spreads to cause epidemics. 14 Self-experimentation provides an important model for human experimentation: the researcher harmed only himself; he did so voluntarily, and
with full knowledge and consent. Further, he did it with highly altruistic motivation.
Human experimentation has achieved many spectacular successes,
7

H.

8

Id.

BEECHER, RESEARCH AND THE INDIVIDUAL: HUMAN STUDIES 5

9 Id. at

1o

(1970).

5-6.

Id. at 6.

11 Id. at 6-8.
12 L. CLENDENING, supra note 4, at 378.
13 Segall, How Koroikof, the Surgeon, Discovered the Auscultatoly Method of Measuring Arterial
Pressure, 83 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 561 (1975).
14 H. BEECHER, supra note 7, at 8-9.
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such as the control of polio 15 and the reported worldwide eradication of
smallpox. 16 It has, on occasion, been an incentive to subjects to attain
important benefits and avoid death or severe harm but not without
great risk. For example, in 1722 inmates in Newgate Prison volunteered
to be inoculated for smallpox as an alternative to hanging. All survived
and were released. However, experiments also have resulted in severe
and sometimes permanent harm or death to subjects. In 1898 Freund
nearly killed his subject while experimenting with X-rays to remove hair
on moles. In 1857 carbon tetrachloride was used as a human anesthetic
even though a few animal studies would have shown it to be unsuitable.
In 1905 Fletcher used the inmates of an insane asylum to study beriberi.
Some forty-three patients contracted the disease, and eighteen died.
The study is considered important and is often cited, but no one has
commented at length on the ethical problems created. In 1902 a series
of experiments were performed on a dozen civil service employees in
order to determine the effects of food preservatives, but there was no
evidence of concern for the subjects' welfare. 17 From 1932 to 1972 the
infamous "Tuskeegee experiment" took place using black males to determine the natural course of syphilis even though treatment had existed
for decades.' 8 Certainly the most demonic but among the most worthless studies of all were those conducted by Nazi physicians on Jewish
civilians, prisoners of war and others interred in concentration camps. 19
Unfortunately, abuses did not end with World War II. In Hyman v.
Jewsh Chronic Disease Hospital, the court denied a petition by the director of a hospital membership corporation to inspect the medical charts
of twenty-two cancer patients who had been injected with live cancer
cells to determine if their bodies' responses to such cells was the same as
for healthy patients. Petitioner argued that the patients were either incompetent or not adequately informed to give consent. Significantly,
the court noted that written informed consent would be required for
similar experiments in the future. 20 There also are the studies by Milgram (1963, 1964, 1974) which were intended to determine whether subjects would continue to inflict pain upon their "victims" (who were
15 See C. FRIED, MEDICAL EXPERIMENTATION:

PERSONAL INTEGRITY AND SOCIAL POL-

Icy 147-48 (1974).
16 Bollett, supra note 6, at 47; Henderson, Smallpox-Epitaphfor a Killer?, 154 NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC 796 (1978).
17 H. BEECHER, supra note 7, at 6-11.
18 Ingelfinger, The Unethicalin MedicalEthics, 83 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 264, 265 (1975);
HARRISON'S PRINCIPLES OF INTERNAL MEDICINE 718, 723 (Isselbacher, et al. eds. 9th ed.
1980).
19 See notes 218-25 & accompanying text infra.
20 21 App. Div. 2d 495, 251 N.Y.S.2d 818 (1964). See notes 285-86 & accompanying text
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actually confederates in the experiment) when ordered to do so by experimenters despite the "victims" protestations. The study concluded
that the great majority of subjects did as ordered; apparently, however,
many were upset because of their conduct during the experiment, and
2
the ethics of that type of study were subsequently called into question. '
While human experimentation has advanced man's knowledge and improved his life, it has failed to keep pace in the development of the safe22
guards needed to protect human subjects.
This is not to say that concern for the welfare of subjects is without
historical and ethical precedent, for just as the origins of human experimentation have ancient roots, so, too, do the antecedents of society's
burgeoning awareness that experimentation on man creates ethical
problems. For example, Celsus, practicing in Alexandria in the third
century B.C., spoke out against the dissection of living men. 23 The oath
attributed to Hippocrates in the fifth century B.C. has been viewed as
giving advice on experimental diagnosis and therapy. Other documents
such as Percival's code of 1803, Beaumont's code of 1833, and Claude
Bernard's personal code of 1856 express concern about the ethical issues
of human experimentation. 24 Moreover, a number of traditions view
the medical practitioner's role as a moral enterprise. For example, the
inscription on the Asklepieon of the Acropolis exhorts physicians to treat
all men as brothers. The Hindu oath instructs physicians to assist all
people as if they are relatives. The Chinese code of Sun Ssumiao (7th
century A.D.) affirms that all people are to be treated equally. And the
prayer of Maimonides ends with a request that God support the physician in his task for the benefit of mankind. 25 The credo basic to these
ethical statements is primum non nocere: "Above all do no harm." A
poignant analogy is that the physician does not stand in relation to his
patient as a carpenter stands before a block of wood. An ethical duty
arises between the physician and the patient whereby the former is not
morally free to exercise his skills in any manner he desires; rather he is
bound by the origin, nature and purpose of his enterprise to use them
26
primarily for the patient's benefit.
21 See, e.g., Dickens, Infomationfor Consent in Human Experimentation, 24 U. TORONTO L.J.
381, 398-99 (1974); S. MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY (1974); see generally Daube,
Legal Problems in MedicalAdvance, 6 ISRAEL L. REV. 1 (1971); Rosenthal, On the Social Pschology
of PschologicalResearch, 51 AM. SCIENTIST 268 (1963); Seeman, Deception in Psychological Research, 24 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1025 (1969).
22 See Beecher, Ethics and Clinical Research, 274 NEw ENGLAND J. MED. 1354 (1966).
23 H. BEECHER, supra note 7, at 10.
24 Id. at 12.
25 See Curran, The Proper and Improper Concerns of Medical Law and Ethics, 295 NEw ENGLAND J. MED. 1057 (1976); Jonsen, Do No
26 Jonsen, supra note 25, at 828.

Ham, 88

ANNALS INTERNAL MED.

827 (1978).
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Governments have also entered the arena of human experimentation by recognizing its great social and economic implications and devoting huge tax revenues to its development. 2 7 Politicians and heads of
state have utilized and exploited the popular appeal and potential for
population control in human experimentation, 28 and military strategists
have sought to use experimentation to achieve victory. 29 Not surprisingly, the role of governments in this field of science causes serious concerns. The works of novelists express the fear of widespread government
control of people's minds and behavior through experiments intended to
perfect psychosurgical techniques, psychological conditioning and
psychotropic drugs. 30 Some commentators have argued that these
fictional accounts may one day exist in reality as a potential result of
experimentation recently conducted in psychosurgery. 3 1 Others have
objected to governmental approval of the coercive use of prisoners, orphans, and the insane. 32 Physicians have reportedly performed experiments on behalf of their governments in order to scientifically study the
effects of torture.3 3 Unchecked government sanctioning of human ex27 See Confrey, PHS Grant-SupportedResearch with Human Subjects, 83 PUB. HEALTH REP.
127, 130 (1968). The United Nations has expressed concern that governments should use
science and technology for the benefit of mankind. See Declaration on the Use of Scientific
and Technological Progress in the Interests of Peace and for the Benefit of Mankind, G. A.
Res. 3384 (XXX), 10 November 1975.
28 See notes 215-25 & accompanying text infra.
29 E. RUSSELL, THE SCOURGE OF THE SWASTIKA 214 (1954).
30 See, e.g., A. BURGESS, A CLOCKWORK ORANGE (1962); M. CRICHTON, THE TERMINAL
MAN (1972); A. HUXLEY, BRAVE NEW WORLD (1932); G. ORWELL, 1984 (1949); E. ZAMIATIN, WE (1924).

31 See M earns, Law andPhysicalControlof the Mind- Experimentationin Pychosurgery, 25 CASE
W. REs. L. REV. 565 (1975). The author argues that by allowing uncontrolled psychosurgical research, our deep reverence for the self and respect for the individual is being relinquished to the psychosurgeon to remake or remold. Id. at 593. See, e.g., Peters & Lee,
Psychosurgery: A Casefor Regulation, 1978 DET. C. L. REv. 383, 386-87, who argue that experimental psychsurgery should only be performed where there is known therapeutic benefit to
the patient and where the degree of risk is determined in light of the seriousness of the condition to which the therapeutic purpose is addressed. See also Kaimowitz v. Dept. of Mental
Health, 1 MENTAL DISABILITY L. REP. 147, 42 U.S.L.W. 2064 (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1973), which
involved a psychosurgery research project of uncertain benefit on a subject in compulsory
confinement. The surgery was prohibited despite approval by two committees and informed
consent procedure. Cf. Nat'l Comm. for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and
Behavioral Research, HEW, Use of Ps chosurgery in Practice andResearch: Report and Recommendations, 42 Fed. Reg. 26,318 (1977). This report implicitly recognized that the efficacy of psychosurgery has not been sufficiently proven so as to be characterized as accepted treatment.
Id. at 26,329. This same conclusion was stated explicitly in Kaimowitz. See Note, Return to the
Cuckoo's Nest: An Examization of the National Commission Report on Psychosurgery, 6 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 941, 954 (1978).
32 See Daube, supra note 21, at 8. See also Yeo, Psychiatry, the Law and Dissent in the Soviet
Union, 14 REV. INT'L COMM. JUR. 34 (1975); Young-Anawaty, InternationalHuman Rights
Norms and Soviet Abuse of(ychiatry, 10 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 785 (1978).
33 Sagan & Jonsen, Medical Ethics and Torture, 294 NEw ENGLAND J. MED. 1427 (1976).
The authors refer to a report in the Manchester Guardian of May 3, 1974, in which photos
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perimentation can result in little or no consideration for the well-being
of the subject. The final stage in the corruption of human experimentation was the deliberate Nazi crimes against humanity, performed in the
34
name of scientific advancement, as disclosed at the Nuremberg trials.
III.

EVOLUTION OF LEGAL CONTROL OF HUMAN
EXPERIMENTATION

Human experimentation becomes most critical in the field of
medicine, where the relationship between the experimenter and his subject is on a direct individual basis and the experiment may jeopardize
the subject's health or life. Medical experimentation is therefore of vital
interest to law and society. 35 Moreover, the traditional doctor-patient

relationship 36 has been affected by the pressures of experimentation so
appeared of prisoners in Portugal taken during interrogation. These prisoners were made
available to prison doctors who wanted to study the effects of torture. Medical experimentation can cross the line into torture when no useful scientific purpose is served and the subject
is transformed into a suffering victim. But see Gellhorn, Violations ofHuman Rights: Torture and
the Medical Profession, 299 NEw ENGLAND J. MED. 358 (1978) (discussing international medical seminar for purpose of preparing casebook on effects of torture for use when legal redress
is possible). See general4' Bassiouni, An Appraisalof Torture in InternationalLaw and Practice: The
Needfor an InternationalConventionfor the Prevention andSuppression of Torture, 48 REVUE INT'LE DE
DROIT NNAL 17 (1977) [hereinafter referred to as The Prevention and Suppression of Torture].
34 See 1-2 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS
UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10, THE MEDICAL CASE (1974). See also Weinschenk,
Nazis Before German Courts, 10 INT'L LAW. 515 (1976). The author states that no instance has
been conclusively established in which any German was punished for refusing to participate
in atrocities and that members of Nazi terror organs knew that they were engaged in criminal
enterprises, dictated by the fanatical aims of the Nazis. Id. at 526-27. The evidence thus
indicates that investigators participated in these crimes and so are not blameless. However, if
left to their own devices, they would not have permitted some of these atrocities to occur.
One of the most important justifications for international criminology is its role in the development of methods for encouraging and reinforcing individuals who resolve voluntarily to
comply with basic humanitarian principles. The Nuremberg tribunal and the war crimes
trials at Tokyo made a beginning by recognizing the principle of individual responsibility for
the commission of crimes against humanity. See Ryu & Silving, InternationalCriminalLaw-A
Searchfor Meaning, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 5, at 26-29 and the actions
of the League of Nations through its DraI2Statutefor an InternationalCourt [1954] U.N.Y.B. 430.
35 Much creative thinking toward understanding the problems involved with human experimentation has occurred in the field of medicine. The medical profession has, of course,
established a long history of genuine concern for the welfare and rights of patients. See notes
23-26 & accompanying text supra. It still enjoys a modicum of confidence and trust from
society. See generaloy H. BEECHER, supra note 7, at 165-213; Levine, BoundariesBetween Research
Involving Human Subjects andAcceptedand Routine ProfessionalPractices,in SYMPOSIUM ON HUMAN
EXPERIMENTATION
EXPERIMENTATION].

3 (R. Bogomolny ed. 1976) [hereinafter cited as

HUMAN

36 In its original form, the doctor-patient relationship was one of mutual confidence and
trust, aimed at the care and treatment of the sick. This was the therapeutic relationship. It
dominates the attitudes and activities of the majority of physicians in practice today. Their
contribution to new medical knowledge is limited, but they nevertheless contribute by using
their training and powers of observation to aid in the accumulation of clinical data. See Page,
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that now the physician is also an investigator, and the patient is also a
subject. 37 The traditional physician regarded his patient primarily as a
subject for treatment rather than for experimentation. Thus, efforts
were directed at responding to the patient's therapeutic needs. 38 Nevertheless medical knowledge advanced, often through surprising clinical
discoveries, followed by crude laboratory and animal studies and finally
through the therapeutic use of experimental findings, usually upon des39
perately ill patients.
In the twentieth century the physician-therapist has been "crossbred" with the ever-emerging scientific investigator whose attitudes and
loyalties are conditioned more by the laboratory than by his patients
and whose preoccupation is, therefore, with designing and conducting
effective experiments to solve problems not readily unravelled by simple
and unsystematic clinical observations. As the investigator discovered
numerous therapeutic measures, he became indispensible to medical research. Thus, a "hybrid" has developed, the physician-investigator. His
perspective is determined by the twin priorities of care for the sick and
the desire for continued medical progress through scientific inquiry.
Those priorities may conflict and create ethical problems when scientific
inquiry can only be made (usually in final stages of a study) on human
beings. 40 Additionally the advent of statistical methodology at the turn
of the twentieth century with its sample size requirements leads to an
increase in the number of subjects needed for a valid and publishable
experiment. Furthermore, the manageability of information afforded
by computer technology encouraged the gathering of ever larger
amounts of data through experimentation. Thus, the potential data
base of human subjects has continued to expand.
On the whole, the new physician-investigator continues to develop
and refine medical knowledge without sacrificing the welfare of the patient. Academic societies were founded to establish rules of basic conduct and to facilitate the free exchange of information.4 1 A kind of
Comments on the Pharmacologic Woof, Warp, and Web, 278 NEW ENGLAND J. MED. 364 (1967).
Cf. Rhoads, Medical Ethics and Morals in a New Age, 205 J.A.M.A. 517 (1968); Silvermen, Informed Consent, 38 PEDIATRICS 373 (1966).
37 The physicians who conducted the early experiments that opened the era of scientific
investigation had tools significantly different from those in use today. See notes 6-17 & accompanying text supra.
38 See generall I. LADIMER

& R.

NEUMAN, CLINICAL INVESTIGATION IN MEDICINE: LE-

(1963); EXPERIMENTATION WITH HUMAN SUBJECTS (P.
Freund ed. 1970).
39 See H. BEECHER, supra note 7, at 5-14.
40 See generally C. FRIED, supra note 15, at 5; Lasagna, A Researcher's Perspective, in HUMAN
EXPERIMENTATION, supra note 35, at 21.
41 See, e.g., Dyck, Kennedy Medical Ethics Program at Harvard, 295 NEW ENGLAND J. MED.
1132 (1976).
GAL, ETHICAL AND MORAL ASPECTS
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"common law" governing most phsician-investigators developed
through administration of the Hippocratic Oath. 4 2 Thus, primary em-

phasis continued to be placed upon the control of illness and the maintenance of a therapeutic rather than an investigative relationship. If,
however, the emphasis in medical science shifts from therapy to investigation, the momentum for scientific discovery may thereby undermine
the traditional morality of the doctor-patient relationship to the extent
43
that the patient's personal rights and welfare will be violated.
The doctor-patient relationship should be distinguished from medical experimentation in its purest form. In the latter the controlled
clinical experiment does not purport to benefit the subject; instead the
subject helps the medical scientist. Although the medical experiment is
part of the quest for the knowledge necessary to alleviate human suffering, the medical scientist creates a dangerous illusion by believing that
by virtue of this principle he can carry out experiments without the consent of the subjects. Medical treatment and controlled medical experimentation are closely related but distinctly different activities. Both
have an equal claim to social approval, but they should be regarded
differently by the law because they differ in character.4 4 The medical
scientist may try to justify non-consensual experimentation on the
grounds that any given patient is the beneficiary of countless prior experiments on others, and, therefore, submission to experimentation is
part of the "price" he pays for these benefits, thereby benefiting future
persons. Although, as a theory, this helps to explain the attitudes of
some doctors toward patient-subjects, the difficulty of quantitatively
and qualitatively measuring the extent of the benefits derived from pre42 One version of this Oath formulated by the World Medical Association in Geneva in
1948 reads as follows:
Now being admitted to the profession of medicine I solemnly pledge to consecrate
my life to the service of humanity. I will give respect and gratitude to my deserving
teacher. I will practice medicine with conscience and dignity. The health and life of my
patient shall be my first consideration. I will maintain the honor and the noble traditions of the medical profession. My colleau,es will be as my brothers. I will not permit
considerations bf race, or religion, nationality, party politics or social standing to intervene between my duty and my patient. I will maintain the utmost respect for human life
from the time of its conception. Even under threat I will not use my knowledge contrary
to the laws of humanity. These promises I make freely and upon my honor.
By this Oath the physician promises to protect the patient's privacy, preserve his dignity and
practice medicine ethically and morally. These elements are incorporated into codes of ethics
of professional societies throughout the world. L. CLENDENING, supra note 4, at 14.
43 See H. BEECHER, supra note 7 (listing some twenty-two published clinical studies in
which, usually by accident but sometimes by intent, violations of subjects' rights occurred).
See also Hyman v. Jewish Chronic Disease Hospital, 21 App. Div. 2d 495, 251 N.Y.S.2d 818
(1964); Wasmuth, Physicians Liabiliy When UsingNew or ExpedimentalDrugs, 31 CLEV. CLIN. Q.
61 (1964).
44 Larsen, Legal Aspects of MedicalExperimenlation, 20 SCANDINAVIAN STUD. IN L. 163, 169
(1976).
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vious experimentation is so great that the theory is dangerously close to
a rationalization.
State involvement in human experimentation has also influenced
the evolution of controls. Because the state has assumed an increasingly
active role in the discovery of medical knowledge through various agencies and as a result of funding various projects, 4 5 its policies concerning
citizens as subjects of experimentation is critical. If the individual is
perceived as a government chattel instead of the beneficiary of government action, then individual rights could be sacrificed whenever the
State's "possessory interests" in its citizens are combined with a purely
scientific-investigative attitude on the part of researchers. These conditions coalesced in Nazi Germany leading to crimes by physicians which
46
came to international attention at Nuremberg.
The Nuremberg medical prosecutions 4 7 offer the scientific and legal
communities important lessons regarding the dangers to individual
safety inherent in human experimentation and the controls needed to
maintain a balance between advances in medical knowledge and the
need to protect individuals. Besides the principle of individual responsibility and the showing of moral delinquency which emerged from the
war crimes proceedings, the trials highlighted the basic notion that
humans could be used as experimental subjects .for purely scientific investigations without regard to therapeutic advantage. This concept was
instilled in the Nazi physicians who received their training at European
universities and who came from every stratum of the German medical
profession. 48 From the start, the Nazi experiments were in violation of
existing German law and the code of ethics of the German medical community,49 but by degrees, the Nazi philosophy eroded the resistance of
the German medical profession until German law was ignored without
legal effect or social opprobrium.5 0 What began, perhaps, as well-inten45 See Fredrickson, Biomedical Research in the 1980"s, 304 NEw ENGLAND J. MED. 509
(1981).
46 A.

MrrSCHERLICH & F. MIELKE, DOCTORS OF INFAMY:

THE STORY OF THE NAZI

MEDICAL CRIMES xi-xii (1949); Enloe, The German Medical War Crimes-TheirNature andSignicance, 30 RHODE ISLAND MED. J. 801 (1947); Ivy, Nazi War Crimes of a Medical Nature, 139

J.A.M.A. 131 (1949); Ivy, The Histog and Ethics of the Use of Human Subjects in Medical Erperiments, 108 SCIENCE 1 (1948); Mellanby, Nazi Experiments on Human Beings in Concentration Camps
in Nazi Germany, 1 BRIT. MED. J. 148 (1947); Mulford, Human Experimentation, 20 STAN. L.
REV. 99 (1967).
47 See J. APPLEMAN, MILITARY TRIBUNALS AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMES 142-43 (1954).
See also W. SHIRER, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE THIRD REICH 979-91 (1960).
48 The excuse given by the experimenters in the latter case for not first testing their experiments on animals first was that animals were either too expensive or not conveniently available. Katz, The Education of the Physician-Investigator,in EXPERIMENTATION WITH HUMAN
SUBJECTS, supra note 38, at 297.
49 Weinschenk, supra note 34, at 518-19.
50 Ivy, Nai War Crimes ofa MedicalNature, supra note 46, at 131. Another factor which has
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tioned scientific inquiry became distorted beyond all reasonable ethical
limits. Even though the defendant physicians at Nuremberg argued
that their studies led to useful information, this argument was rejected,
both on its own terms and in light of the harm done to the subjects. 5 1
The Nuremberg medical trials also suggest that the magnitude of
the crimes committed would have been impossible without the involvement of the State. Scientists were, in part, persuaded to engage in experiments because of the knowledge that the subjects available to them
52
were actually prisoners already scheduled for disposal by the State.
This practice hideously dramatizes the notion that the state is free to
treat its nationals in the manner it chooses because it perceives itself as
the source of all rights, and therefore as beyond the reach of law, rather
than regarding rights as inalienable, that is, not subject to arbitrary cancellation by the State.5 3 The Nazi barbarism is a stark illustration of the
common-sense notion that as state oppression grows, individual rights
decline.
Even in more benign systems, there is the potential danger to personal welfare resulting from society's need for pure scientific investigation and its acceptance of the philosophy ofjustifiable personal sacrifice
for the public good.5 4 The combination of such conditions not only
been attributed to the moral destruction of the German medical profession under Hitler is the
notion that "the welfare of the armed forces was the supreme good and anything that helped
the armed forces was the supreme good and anything that helped the armed forces was
right." Id. at 144. See also Enloe, supra note 46, at 804.
51 Ivy, Nazi War Crimes of a Medical Nature, supra note 46, at 132.
52 3 RECORD, THE TRIAL OF GERMAN MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS 160-61 (1946).

53 The atrocities reported at Nuremberg were only a few of many examples in political
history of misappropriation of individual rights for public expediency. One of the earliest
such events recorded concerns the sacrifice of youths to provide blood for Pope Innocent VIII,
in a futile attempt to restore the aging pontiff to vigorous youth. Beecher, Scarce Resources and
Medical Advancement, in EXPERIMENTATION WITH HUMAN SUBJECTS, supra note 38, at 88.
Another example was provided by Queen Caroline of England, who, before allowing her own
children to be inoculated with cow pox, had the vaccine tested on prisoners and children of
the poor. Beecher, Experimentation in Man, 169 J.A.M.A. 461, 469 (1959). The Nazi brutality
presented, ironically in Germany, a contradiction of Germany's greatest philosopher, Immanuel Kant, whose central theory of ethics held that people should never be treated as means
but only as ends. I. KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 47 (L. Beck
trans. 1959).
54 See EXPERIMENTATION WITH HUMAN SUBJECTS, supra note 38, at xviii. Even under
more benevolent forms of government, the rights of the individual may be subordinated to
the public health, safety or welfare. See generally Macklin & Sherwin, Experimenting on Human
Subjects: PhilosophicalPerspectives, 25 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 434 (1975). The most common
expression of this concept is the right of nations to conscript male citizens for the armed forces
in time of armed conflict. There are also more subtle ways in which the State exacts personal

sacrifice for the public good, without allowing freedom of choice, as for example, the right of
the State to confiscate personal property through eminent domain, taxation and compulsory
inoculation before entry into school or before travel abroad. See also Dickens, epra note 21, at
408, who suggests that in time of national emergency, individuals may be asked to participate
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poses the dangers of using the ends to justify the means but could also
result in the failure by states or scientists to establish effective laws for
the proper conduct of scientific investigation. 55
A major issue at Nuremberg was defining the criteria for ethical
human experimentation. Consequently, the Articles of the Nuremberg
Tribunal developed as the first formal attempt to create a legal framework governing human experimentation. These Articles provide:
1. The voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely essential.
This means that the person involved should have legal capacity to
give consent; should be so situated as to be able to exercise free power
of choice, without the intervention of any element of force, fraud,
deceit, duress, overreaching, or other ulterior form of constraint or
coercion; and should have sufficient knowledge and comprehension
of the elements of the subject matter involved as to enable him to
make an understanding and enlightened decision. This latter element requires that before the acceptance of an affirmative decision
by the experimental subject there should be made known to him the
nature, duration, and purpose of the experiment; the method and
means by which it is to be conducted; all inconveniences and hazards
to be expected; and the effects upon his health or person which may
possibly come from his participation in the experiment.
The duty and responsibility for ascertaining the quality of the consent rests upon each individual who initiates, directs, or engages in
the experiment. It is a personal duty and responsibility which may
not be delegated to another with impunity.
2. The experiment should be such as to yield fruitful results for the good
of society, unprocurable by other methods or means of study, and not
random and unnecessary in nature.
3. The experiment should be so designed and based on results of animal
experimentation and a knowledge of the natural history of the disease
or other problems under study that the anticipated results will justify
the performance of the experiment.
4. The experiment should be so conducted as to avoid all unnecessary
physical and mental suffering and injury.
5. No experiment should be conducted where there is an a priori reason
to believe that death or disabling injury will occur; except, perhaps,
in those experiments where the experimental physicians also serve as
subjects.
6. The degree of risk to be taken should never exceed that determined
by the humanitarian importance of the problem to be solved by the
experiment.
7. Proper preparations should be made and adequate facilities provided
to protect the experimental subject against even remote possibilities
of injury, disability or death.
8. The experiment should be conducted only by scientifically qualified
in experiments without their consent in order to develop new drugs or forms of treatment as
matters of vital national or international urgency.
55 H. BEECHER, supra note 7, at 192-200.
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persons. The highest degree of skill and care should be required
through all stages of the experiment of those who conduct or engage
in the experiment.
9. During the course of the experiment the human subject should be at
liberty to bring the experiment to an end if he has reached the physical or mental state where continuation of the experiment seems to
him to be impossible.
10. During the course of the experiment the scientist in charge must be
prepared to terminate the experiment at any stage, if he has probable
cause to believe, in the exercise of the good faith, superior skill, and
careful judgment required of him, that a continuation of the experiment is likely
to result in injury, disability, or death to the experimen56
tal subject.
The concepts of Nuremberg were reevaluated at the meeting of the
World Medical Association in Helsinki, in June of 1964, and were incorporated into the Code of Ethics on Human Experimentation of the
World Medical Association.5 7 Helsinki was the second formal attempt
to place human experimentation within a legal framework.58 Those
meeting at Helsinki emphasized that the Declaration of Geneva by the
World Medical Association, 5 9 include the words: "The health of my patient will be my first consideration," and be binding upon the physician.
60
They also pointed out that the International Code of Medical Ethics

declares that "any act or advice which could weaken physical or mental
resistance of a human being may be used only in his interest." Based
upon those underlying concepts the final Code embodied the following
basic principles:
1. Clinical research must conform to the moral and scientific principles
that justify medical research and should be based on laboratory and
animal experiments or other scientifically established facts.
2. Clinical research should be conducted only by scientifically qualified
persons and under the supervision of a qualified medical man.
3. Clinical research cannot legitimately be carried out unless the importance of the objective is in proportion to the inherent risk to the
subject.
4. Every clinical research project should be preceded by careful assess56 See J. APPLEMAN, supra note 47, at 147-48; Beeson, Bondy, Donnelly, & Smith, Panel
Discussion: Moral Issues in Clinical Research, 36 YALE J. BIOLOGY & MED. 455-56 (1964).
57 Anonymous, World MedicalAssociation, Human Experimentation: Code ofEthics of the World
MedicalAssociation, 2 BRrr. MED. J. 177 (1964); Declaration of Helsinki, adopted first by the
World Medical Association in 1964, Declarationof Helsinki: Recommendations Guiding Doctors in
ClinicalResearch, 197 J.A.M.A. 32 (1966).
58 Bryant, the Burgeoning Law of Medical Experimentation Involving Human Subjects, 8 JOHN
MARSHALL J. PRAC. & PROC. 19, 20 (1974).
59 Anonymous, The Declarationof Geneva, 1948: A 1971 Reapprairal,2 MED. J. AUSTL. 735

(1971).
60 Adopted by the Third General Assembly of the World Medical Association at London,
October, 1949.
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ment of inherent risks in comparison to foreseeable benefits to the subject or to others.
5. Special caution should be exercised by the doctor in performing
clinical research in which the personality of 6the
subject is liable to be
1
altered by drugs or experimental procedure.
The World Medical Association also defined, for the first time, a
fundamental distinction between clinical research, which is essentially
therapeutic, and "pure" clinical research, which is primarily for the purpose of acquiring scientific information with little anticipated therapeutic value to the subject. 6 2 Different guidelines were formulated for each
situation:
A.

ClinicalResearch Combined with Professional Care

1. In the treatment of the sick person the doctor must be free to use
a new therapeutic measure if in his judgment it offers hope of
saving life, re-establishing health or alleviating suffering. If at all
possible, consistent with patient psychology, the doctor should
obtain the patient's freely-given consent after the patient has
been given a full explanation. In case of legal incapacity, consent should also be procured from the legal guardian; in case of
physical incapacity, the permission of the legal guardian replaces
that of the patient.
2. The doctor can combine clinical research with professional care,
the objective being the acquisition of new medical knowledge,
only to the extent that clinical research is justified by its therapeutic value for the patient.
B.

Nontherapeutic ClinicalResearch

1. In the purely scientific application of clinical research carried
out on a human being, it is the duty of the investigator to remain
the protector of the life, health, and privacy of that person on
whom clinical research is being carried out.
2. The nature, the purpose, and the risk of clinical research must be
explained to the subject by the investigator.
3a. Clinical research on a human being cannot be undertaken without his free consent, after he has been fully informed; if he is
legally incompetent, the consent of the legal guardian should be
procured.
3b. The subject of clinical research should be in such a mental, physical, and legal state as to be able to exercise fully his power of
choice.
3c. Consent should as a rule be obtained in writing. However, the
responsibility for clinical research always remains with the research workers; it never falls on the subject, even after the consent is obtained.
4a. The investigator must respect the right of each individual to
safeguard his personal integrity and privacy, especially if the
subject is in a dependent relationship to the investigator.
61
62

See note 56 supra.
See H. BEECHER, supra note 7, at 279.

HUMAN EXPERIMENTA TION APPRAISAL

1981]
4b.

1611

At any time during the course of clinical research, the subject or
his guardian should be free to withdraw permission for research
to be continued. The investigator or the investigation team
should discontinue the research if in his or their
judgment it
63
may, if continued, be harmful to the individual.

Clearly, the scientists who met at Helsinki could not condemn all
human experimentation. They recognized that medical science had advanced beyond the point where simple observation and accumulation of
random clinical data could satisfy the requirements for effective inquiry
into the causes and treatment of human disease. It was also apparent

that the Helsinki Code would serve only as a broad guideline, against
which the investigator must compare his conduct in relation to the subject-patient. 64
The Code of Ethics on Human Experimentation of the World
Medical Association has been adopted by the American Medical Association and, in modified but similar forms, by most professional medical
65
organizations throughout the world.
IV.

ISSUES OF PROTECTION UNRESOLVED BY EXISTING CODES

The Nuremberg Code has been criticized as imposing a rigid set of
legalistic demands. It is argued that the Code, in an attempt to provide
for all contingencies, unduly restricts the investigator by requiring him
to anticipate and provide for every situation and by demanding thb impossible in some instances. 66 The Helsinki Code, on the other hand, is
said to provide only broad concepts that fail to effectively protect hu67
manitarian interests because it is inapplicable in many circumstances.
Moreover, terms used in both codes lack specificity and are therefore
susceptible to definition and interpretation by the investigator according
to his own experiences. The fluid concepts of these codes also fail to
answer several questions concerning the protection of human subjects.
A.

CONSENT

The adequacy of the subject's consent required by these codes is
uncertain. Article One of the Nuremberg Code provides that consent be
"voluntary," without coercion and "informed." But those criteria are
objectionable because the subject's truly informed consent cannot be obtained since the results of experiments are not known beforehand. 68 Un63 Se note 56 sura.
64 See H. BEECHER, supra note 7, at 278-79.

65 Shaffer, Mledical Ethics, 1 EDITORIAL RESEARCH REP. 461, 470 (1972).
66 H. BEECHER, sufira note 7, at 279.

67 Hill, MedicalEthics and Controlled Tials, 1 BRrr. MED. J. 1043 (1963).
68 H. BEECHER, supra note 7, at 278-79; cf. Hill, supra note 68, who argues that there are
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like informed consent in the medical malpractice setting,69 there is no
norm for the conduct of a "pure" scientific experiment. The investigator is in no position to "inform" his subject of potential complications
due to the limited knowledge available regarding an experimental drug
or therapeutic technique. 70 Nevertheless, with the "pure" scientific investigation, consent which does not meet the criteria of "informed"

7
should not relieve the investigator of liability. '

A related question is the ability of the intended experimental subject to "consent" to invasion of his person or to procedures the results of
which are uncertain, of dubious benefit or clearly harmful. For example, no individual may consent to "euthanasia murder. ' 72 Consent to
abortion was also once prohibited in the United States, 73 but now it
may not be lawfully performed as an elective procedure after viability in
the absence of therapeutic indications, which has been defined by the
United States Supreme Court as the time at which the attending physiexperimental situations involving human subjects, as for example, in industrial psychology
experiments, in which the subject's informed consent is undesirable and should not be sought.
For a discussion of the problems of consent and compulsory confinement of mental patients in
Britain, see Gostin, The Merger of Incompetenc and Certifcation. The Illustration of Unauthorized
Medical Contact in the Psychiatric Context, 2 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 127 (1979). See general'
Harding & Curran, MentalHealth Legislationand Its Relationship to ProgramDevelopment: An InternationalReview, 16 HARV. J. LEGIS. 19 (1979). For the problems of consent to sterilization see
Comment, Sterilization Abuse: A ProposedRegulatory Scheme, 28 DEPAUL L. REV. 731 (1979).
69 Informed consent as it exists in medical malpractice should not be confused with the
consent sought of a normal individual subjected to a "pure" scientific experiment. In the
context of malpractice, the physician is required to follow a known pattern of therapy on a
sick individual. Liability is imposed and remedies set for failure to conform to a pre-arranged
routine that is known and predictable. Treatment is explained to the patient before it is
administered, and the patient accepts it knowing the anticipated results as well as the possible
complications. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 103-04 (4th ed. 1971).
70 The remedy of insurance schemes is intended to provide compensation when injury
results from inadequacy of informed consent. Adams & Shea-Stonum, Toward a Theoy of
Control of Medical Experimentation with Human Subjects: The Role of Compensation, 25 CASE W.
RES. L. REv. 604 (1975); Silverstein, Compensating Those Injured through Experimentation, 48
CONN. B.J. 398 (1974); Simonies, On Behalf of Victims of Psuedo-MedicalExperiments. Red Cross
Action, extract from the INT'L REV. RED CROSS,Geneva (January, 1973); Spiro, Constraintand
Consent, 293 NEw ENGLAND J. MED. 1134 (1975). See also Friedman,Health Hazards Associated
with Recombinant DNA Technology: Should Congress Impose Liability Without Fault?, 51 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1355, 1374 (1978).
71 See Dickens, supra note 21, at 393; Dickens, ContractualAspects of Human Medical Exper mentation, 25 U. TORONTO L.J. 406, 424 (1975). See also Vaccarino, Consent, Informed Consent
and the Consent Form, 298 NEw ENGLAND J. MED. 455 (1978). But see Shrank, Determinism and
the Law of Consent-A Reformulation of Individual Accountability for Choices Made Without "Free
Will," 12 SUFFOLK L. REV. 796, 821 (1978) (arguing that consent is only a relatively important factor).
72 See generally Kutner, Euthanasia: Due Processfor Death with Dignity; The Living Will, 54
IND. L.J. 201 (1979).
73 Seegenerally M. BASSIOUNI, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAw 236-39 (1978); G. FLETCHER,
RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 373-79 (1978); W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT,HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW 530-32 (1972).
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cian judges that there is a reasonable probability of the fetus's ability to
74
survive outside the womb, with or without artificial support.
B.

VOLUNTEERS

The legality of using involuntary subjects in experiments has often
been challenged. The subjects who are usually coerced into participating are (1) imprisoned convicts, (2) inmates of mental hospitals or domiciliary institutions, (3) patients in "free" or "clinic" hospitals, often
affiliated with medical, educational, or research facilities, (4) indigent
patients, (5) service men, and (6) children, including the mentally
handicapped and (7) fetuses. Subjects in all but the last category may
be coerced, often by subtle means, because of their vulnerable station in
life.75 In some instances-for example, with children or mental pa-

tients-the subject may lack the ability to fully understand an explanation of the proposed experiment. 76 The potential for abuse is further
complicated by the low public interest in such individuals. The coerced
subject, therefore, often reacts to subtle pressures by complying, rather
than by making an intelligent and informed decision. Likewise, prisoners may become "volunteers" because of their inability to resist material
inducements. This is also a means by which experimenters from a prosperous industrialized country can obtain subjects in a developing country. By contrast, medical institutions, which are charged with
responsibility for teaching competent clinical medicine and exist primarily for therapy of sick patients, perform their research within the therapeutic doctor-patient relationship, which thereby minimizes the danger
of infringing upon the patient's rights. Such protection remains even if
all therapy is broadly regarded as quasi-experimental. However, subjects outside of medical institutions are not always ensured of similar
protection.7 7 Thus, greater focus on protection of subjects in the context
74 Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379 (1979). For a summary of the changes in the law of
abortion since Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) and Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973), see
Comment, Viability and Fetal Life in State Criminal Abortion Laws, 72 J. CRIM. L. & C. 324
(1981). For a discussion of the failure of the law to tell the physician how to balance the
woman's interests in a safe and legal abortion against the state's interest in protecting fetal life
and the consequent criminal or tort liability that may be imposed, see Note, CrminalLiability
ofPhysicans. An Encroachment on the Abortion Right, 18 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 591 (1981).
75 See generalgv U.S. NAT'L COMM'N FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, HEW, RESEARCH INVOLVING CHILDREN 21-26
(1977); H. BEECHER, supra note 7, at 52-78; C. FRIED, supra note 15, at 61-63; Curran, Research
on Children, 299 NEW ENGLAND J. MED. 1001 (1978); Daube, supra note 21, at 10; Martin,
Ethical StandardsforFetalExperimentation, 43 FORDHAM L. REV. 547 (1975).
76 Daube, supra note 21, at 10.
77 See Curran & Beecher, Experimentation in Children: A Reexaminationof Legal EthicalPrinciples, 210 J.A.M.A. 77 (1969); Hodges & Bean, The Use of PrisonersforMedical Research, 202
J.A.M.A. 177 (1967); Martin, Arnold, Zimmerman & Richart, Human Subjects in Clinical Research-A Report of Three Studies, 279 NEw ENCLAND J. MED. 1426 (1968); McDonald, Why
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of detention, custody or control is needed since freedom of choice is unlikely in such environments.
C.

CONVENIENCE OF EXPERIMENTAL SUBJECTS

Three classes of experimental subjects may be especially vulnerable
to experimentation conducted without regard for their rights. These
classes include aborted ftuses, "fabricated" individuals created in vitro,
and terminal patients. The rights of aborted fetuses and terminal patients may be disregarded because life expectancy is certain rather than
indefinite. The effect of the experimental act on the survival of the subject is thereby disregarded, since the propriety of the act is said to depend upon whether the decision to abort or to regard a patient as
terminal is irrevocable. Such individuals thus become experimental
subjects mainly because of convenience and not necessarily because the
experiment is meritorious. 78 Even with scientifically sound experiments
involving abortions, investigators have reasoned that the parents' decision to abort degrades the fetus into nothing more than a piece of tissue.
So long as it appears that the experiment will benefit "society" or other
fetuses and that the aborted fetus alone will be harmed andnot survive,
it is said to follow that such research should be approved. But if the
experiment may increase the chances for survival of the aborted fetus,
already determined to be unwanted by its parents, such research, it is
argued, should be condemned. This line of reasoning reverses the canons of medical ethics, which require that experimental procedures pro79
duce therapeutic benefit to the subject.
Fabricated individuals are those who are conceived and maintained
Prisoners Volunteer to be ExpernentalSubjects, 202 J.A.M.A. 511 (1967); Schreiner, Liabiliy in Use
of InvestigationalDrugs, 185 J.A.M.A. 259 (1963). See generally U.S. NAT'L COMM'N FOR THE
PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, HEW
RESEARCH INVOLVING PRISONERS: APPENDIX TO REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS (1976)

(Dep't of H.E.W. Pub. No. (05) 76-132).
78 See Appel, Ethical and Legal Questions Posed by Recent Advances in Medicine, 205 J.A.M.A.
513 (1968); Brown, Ground Rules for Physicians Who Evaluate Drugs, 203 J.A.M.A. 137 (1968);
Freund, Ethical Problems in Human Expeuimentation, 273 NEw ENGLAND J. MED. 687 (1965);
Friend, ClinicalEvaluation of Drugs, 187 J.A.M.A. 348 (1964); Martin, supra note 75, at 568-69.
The notion of "implied consent" persist in every milieu involving humans as experimental
subjects and must be dealt with whenever "pure" scientific inquiry without immediate benefit to the subject is contemplated. See H. BEECHER, supra note 7, at 25-26.
79 P. RAMSEY, THE ETHICS OF FETAL RESEARCH 37-40 (1975). Any fetus whose mother
intends to carry it until birth is not included here because its life expectancy is not definite.
See also Curran, Expermentation Becomes a Crime: PetalResearch in Massachusetts, 292 NEW ENGLAND J. MED. 300 (1975). Condemned prisoners could also be regarded as "terminal" and
in need of the same protection as aborted fetuses and dying patients. See Daube, supra note
21, at 8.
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for a limited time in vitro. Society may tend to regard such subjects 0 as
not fully entitled to the protections accorded to persons conceived in the
ordinary way. Cynical and opportunistic attitudes may ultimately develop as a result of decreased legal protection provided to aborted fetuses, terminal patients and fabricated individuals, which may
ultimately weaken society's sense of lawfulness and respect for the sanctity of life. 8 ' An individual should not become less human, that is, his
physical integrity and right to be free from exploitation should not be
less valued in an experimental setting, when the time of death is known
or the manner of conception is artificial.
D.

ADEQUACY AND EFFICIENCY OF EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN

Whether an experiment is designed adequately and efficiently to
answer the questions it raises is frequently overlooked as a possible
source of violation of the subject's rights. The investigator must be
obliged to show that the risks his subjects undergo are justified by the
usefulness of the anticipated data, the so-called "risk/benefit ratio."
Relevant experiments must be well-designed in order to obtain information efficiently, with risks to subjects minimized. Finally, if the experiment poses real dangers to human subjects, the investigator should be
required to demonstrate to an appropriate administrative or judicial
body that the information is not obtainable in any other feasible manner. That is, he must show that the purpose of his experiment is to
acquire knowledge about a certain class of individuals - for example,
fetuses or mental incompetents - and not that this class is simply convenient. Although some leeway is essential for the investigator, experiments potentially dangerous to subjects should be conducted only after
82
thorough pre-clinical evaluation.
E.

REPEATED EVALUATION OF ONGOING HUMAN EXPERIMENTS

The original purpose of an experiment may become altered or the
subjects's rights may be suppressed or overlooked under pressure of the
changing requirements of an ongoing research project. Once the investigation is underway, the need to direct it with regard to its purposes and
the subject's rights weigh heavily upon the investigator. The personal
80 The Supreme Court holds that someone is not a "person" until birth. Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
81 Tuchler, Man-Made Man and the Law, 22 ST. Louis U.L.J. 310, 325 (1978). See also
Dinstein, Science, Technology and Human Rights, 5 DALHOUSIE L.J. 155, 161-62 (1979); Reich,
'Test-Tube'Babies, 27 NEw PHYSICIAN 39 (1978). One commentator cites an ethically objectionable Finnish study in which nonviable fetuses were decapitated to study the effects of
certain chemicals. Brock, FetalResearch: What Price Progress? 1979 DaT. C. L. REv. 403, 406.
82 Curran & Beecher, supra note 77, at 78.
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integrity necessary for the investigator to comprehend the moral and
ethical dimensions of the experiment as it progresses is greatly influenced by his education and philosophical perspective. Significant assurance of protection of the subject's rights during the course of an
experiment must be given by the investigator himself because substan3
tive and procedural guidelines cannot encompass every contingency.
However, national and local review committees must also be charged
with evaluation of ongoing research. If it is reasonably certain that the
original purpose has been altered or that the subject's rights may be
violated and the investigator has not been apprised of these problems or
has not taken adequate steps to alleviate them, then the review commit84
tee must step in to protect the subjects.
F.

STATE INVOLVEMENT

The state is inevitably called upon to balance the public good
against individual rights. This problem is critical in human experimentation, especially with respect to matters affecting entire communitiesfor example, control of communicable diseases, preschool inoculations,
preventive health care and birth control. The power of the state ensures
compliance with public health regulations. It also gives rise to fnoral
and ethical questions concerning government agencies and administrators, whose actions may be aimed at protecting the public good but also
might introduce risk to the individual.8 5 Therefore, moral and ethical
considerations necessary for proper human experimentation cannot be
the entire responsibility of the principal investigator, but must be shared
by the state administrative structure under which he functions.
G.

CHEMICAL AND PHARMACEUTICAL EXPERIMENTATION OR A
TRANSNATIONAL BASIS

The potential of harm to human subjects exists in the context of
experimentation with chemical and pharmaceutical products by companies from developed countries performed on nationals of third world
countries. The testing of such substances may produce side effects and
result in great harm. Companies, by supplying monetary compensation
beforehand to all volunteers, could be released from responsibility for
harmful effects. Monetary inducement makes individuals in developing
nations especially vulnerable. Even intelligent and fully informed con83 Wakerlin & Sembower, Legal Aspects of Medical Research, 141 J.A.M.A. 429 (1949);

Wolfensberger, Ethical Issues in Research with Human Subjects, 155 SCIENCE 47 (1967).
84 Confrey, supra note 27; Shannon, The Advancement of Medical Research: A Twent-Year
View ofthe Role of the National Institutes of Health, 42 J. MED. EDUC. 97 (1967).
85 See Cowan, Human Experimentation: The Review Process in Practice, 25 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 533, 552 (1975).
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sent is easier to obtain, despite the high degree of risk involved. An
implicit element of duress exists because economic inducements are difficult to refuse. As a result, subjects may not be adequately protected
because most developing countries lack the control mechanisms which
are found in industrialized countries. Although this problem has not
been explicitly addressed at the international level, some precedent for
regulation exists by analogy to other situations.8 6 One effective solution
is to apply the regulatory standards of the country involved which provides the most protection to the subjects and is most likely to be the
developed country.8 7 These standards, along with those of the medical
profession, should provide greater control of the chemical and pharmaceutical industry.
V.

CODIFICATION OF HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION IN
THE UNITED STATES

Since 1960 the United States has seriously attempted to establish
statutory criteria for human experimentation 88 and has actively partici86 One basic doctrine of international law is that a state may not use its territory in any
manner which is harmful to the territory of another state. This principle was applied in
United States v. Canada (Trail Smelter Case), 9 ANN. Dir. 315, 35 AM. J. INT'L L. 684
(1941). There, the United States government made certain representations on behalf of the
State of Washington. Citizens of Washington alleged that noxious fumes emitted from a
smelter located in Trail, British Columbia, were causing considerable damage to property
and livestock. Canada was eventually held responsible for most of the damage. The Trail
Smelter case implies that citizens of one nation may not engage in any activity which is likely
to cause harm to the citizens or territory of another nation. This principle was at issue in
Great Britain v. Albania (Corfu Channel Case), [1949] I.C.J. 4. There persons of allegedly
unknown origin placed mines in the waters of an international strait that lay within the

territorial waters of Albania. One British destroyer was sunk and others damaged in attempting to cross these waters. The Court held Albania responsible for the consequences of activities of persons within its territory and ordered Albania to pay reparations. The principle
which emerges from the Corfu Chanel case is one which approaches absolute responsibility.
This principle is also advanced in the Convention on International Liability for Damage
Caused by Space Objects, G.A. Res. 2777, 26 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 29) 25, U.N. Doc.
A/8429 (1971). Article II provides for "absolute liability" to pay compensation by the
launching state for damages caused by its space object. These three examples indicate that
one nation would be responsible for damages to the people or territory of another nation.
Likewise, a drug company from a developed country may be held liable for damages caused
to experimental subjects in a Third World country. This is one means of monitoring the
activities of drug companies abroad. For a detailed discussion of this problem, see Zilinskas,
Recombinant DNA Research and the InternationalSystem, 51 S. CAL_ L. REv. 1483, 1490-91

(1978). Developing countries are also intent upon bringing the benefits of science and technology, including financial gain, to their peoples and accordingly may refuse to let human
rights considerations impede progress. Dinstein, supra note 81, at 163.
87 See U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a note, 78m, 78dd-1,
78dd-2, 78ff, which provides that the standards of the country of origin apply to corporations
or their subsidiaries or affiliates or if they are controlled in fact through management or
ownership, ie., of more than 25 percent of the outstanding shares of stock.
88 Curran, Governmental Regulation ofthe Use of Human Subjects in Medical Research: The Ap-
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pated, with some regrettable exceptions,8 9 with other nations in attacking medical and health problems of international scope. These
international attempts at medical cooperation furnish a useful starting
point for establishing an international code for regulation of human experimentation. An international code is a logical progression from the
strong influence of the Nuremberg and Helsinki Codes and from the
broad doctrinal foundation already laid for cooperation among sovereign nations in this largely unexplored area of international law. 90 A
survey of the legislation reveals that lawmakers have perceived the need
to regulate human experimentation and have responded with a variety
of schemes. 9 1
A.

AMERICAN CASE LAW ON HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION

Prior to 1960 there was little common law in the field of human
experimentation. There were no recorded attempts to regulate research
organizations or investigators except on a voluntary basis, and there was
proach of Two FederalAgencies, in EXPERIMENTATION WITH HUMAN SUBJECTS, supra note 38,
at 402, 409-49.
89 The credibility of such United States participation has recently been called into question by the Nestles infant formula incident where the United States was the only United
Nations member not voting against the distribution of a milk product linked to an increased
incidence of infant death and malnutrition in developing countries. See TIME, June 1, 1981,
at 26. See also The Infant Formula Controversy: An InternationalHealth Poliy Paradigm, 95 ANNALS
INTERNAL MED. 383 (1981) (criticizing negative U.S. vote on World Health Organization's
"International Code of Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes" and urging increased participation by health care professionals in international health problems).
90 This doctrinal foundation is still unorganized and scattered throughout several disciplines. However, development of international regulatory schemes has been found to progress
according to a discernable pattern. In the first phase, scholars postulate certain philosophies
in their writings. Second, these writings become the premises of more specific theoretical
writings. These in turn give impetus to certain international undertakings. Then the formulation of specific normative prescriptions follows. Finally, sanctioning devices are shaped.
Bassiouni, An Appraisal of the Growth andDeveloping Trends of InternationalCriminalLaw, 46 REVUE INT'LE DE Daorr PENAL 405, 409 (1974). As this study seeks to demonstrate, the field of
human experimentation has ripened to the point at which international controls are feasible.
91 For an analysis of the constitutional standards which statutes governing scientific research must meet in the United States, see Robertson, The Scientists Right to Research: A Constitutional Analysis, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 1203 (1978). The author argues that the pursuit of
scientific research is protected by the fourteenth amendment as a fundamental personal liberty, by the right to freedom of association, and primarily by the first amendment by fulfilling
the individual's interest in personal expression and society's interest in the receiving of information necessary for social and political decision-making. Id. at 1209-15. Direct prohibition
of certain kinds of research by the State is permissible if the means used by researchers to
acquire scientific knowledge intrude on interests with which the state has legitimate concern.
Id. at 1253. Thus, first amendment protection for scientific research is aimed at safeguarding
the scientist's private research goals and methods from direct State interference. If the State
restricts research out of fear of the knowledge that may be produced, it must meet the strict
standards of prior restraint and incitement which with respect to protected speech are based
on content. Id. at 1278. For a discussion of constitutional issues in the context of medical
treatment, see Peters & Lee, supra note 31, at 388-405; Note, supra note 31, at 964-69.
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no litigation for malpractice or criminal actions against research organizations or personnel. Generally, however, the legal climate was hostile
toward research, which was regarded as deviating from accepted methods. The doctor "experimented" at his peril. 92 When litigation finally
came, the courts viewed experimentation by the clinician responsible for
the competent cure of the patient, as the rash, ignorant or unskilled de93
parture from approved methods.
In 1935 a significant and enlightened decision by the Michigan
Supreme Court in Fortnerv. Koch 94 announced that human experimentation is necessary for medical purposes. The court removed clinical experimentation from the "outlaw status," authorizing medical
investigation provided that the subjects knew of the experiment and
consented to it, and so long as the experiment did not depart too radically from accepted treatment methods. 9 5 Prior to Fortner,experimentation was regarded as an intentional attack upon the patient and was
treated in theory as battery. The gist of the cause of action was the
absence of plaintiff's consent to the contact, rather than the wrongful
intent of the defendant. 96 Liability was imposed for dangerous or inappropriate action to which the plaintiff had not consented. The Fortner
court removed clinical research from those constraints and placed it in
the context of "reasonableness." It anticipated that acceptable stanand procedure of
dards could be developed by examining the practice
97
clinical investigators serving as expert witnesses.
More recently, another court has also restricted physicians in their
choice of experimental treatment for a patient. In Kaimowitz v. Dep't of
92 R. MORRIS & A. MORTIZ, DOCTOR AND PATIENT AND THE LAW 346-50 (1971); Cady,

Medical Maloractice: What About Experimentation?,6 ANNALS W. MED. & SURGERY 164 (1952);

Curran,supra note 91, at 402-09; Ladimer, Ethicaland LegalAspects ofMedicalResearch on Human
Beings, 3 J. PUB. L. 467, 476-80 (1954).
93 Slater v. Baker, 2 Wils. [KB.] 359 (1767). Slater established the principle that if a
standard therapy is available and the patient does not consent to experimental therapy, the

physician is absolutely liable for any harm caused from use of the experimental therapy. Id.
at 362. See L. REGAN, DOCTOR, PATIENT AND THE LAW 381 (2d ed. 1949). Brown v.
Hughes, 94 Colo. 295, 30 P.2d 259 (1934); Langford v. Kosterlitz, 107 Col. App. 175, 290 P.
80 (1930); Board of Medical Registration and Examination of Indiana v. Kaadt, 225 Ind.
625, 76 N.E.2d 669 (1948); Carpenter v. Blake, 60 Barb. 488 (N.Y. 1871); Hodgson v. Bigelow, 335 Pa. 497, 7 A.2d 338 (1939).
94 272 Mich. 273, 261 N.W. 762 (1935).
95 Id. at 282, 261 N.W. at 765.
96 W. PROSSER, supfra note 69, at 36.
97 272 Mich. 273, 261 N.W. 762 (1935). Accord, Karp v. Cooley, 493 F.2d 408 (1974)
(holding that as to the issue of medical experimentation, the rules of medical malpractice
should apply, ie., that expert testimony was required to support allegations that defendants
had deviated from accepted norms of practice so as to be negligent or grossly negligent). See
also Curran, The First Mechanical Heart Transplant: Informed Consent and Experimentation, 291
NEW ENGLAND J. MED. 1015 (1974).
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Mental Health ,98 the court held that an involuntarily confined mental
patient was unable to give informed consent to an experimental
psychosurigical procedure. 99 The patient involved had been committed
to a state hospital under Michigan's criminal sexual psychopath law.
He and his parents signed consent forms allowing him to undergo the
experimental procedure designed to control violent behavior in persons
suffering from uncontrollable aggression.10 0 Suit was brought by an attorney on behalf of the patient, and all others similarly situated, seeking
a writ of habeas corpus on grounds that the patient was being illegally
detained for experimental psychosurgery. 10'
Two issues were presented to the court. The first was whether an
involuntarily detained mental patient is capable of giving informed consent to experimental psychosurgery which may alter thoughts, emotions
or behavior. The second was whether, assuming the patient could consent, the State Department of Mental Health could conduct experimental psychosurgery on involuntarily confined mental patients in hospitals
under its jurisdiction. 0 2 The court answered the first question in the
1°3
negative, and therefore did not reach the second.
The court identified three criteria for informed consent, which it
ascertained from the Nuremberg standards: competence, knowledge,
and voluntariness. 10 4 The court explained that competence "requires
the ability of the subject to understand rationally the nature of the procedure, its risks, and other relevant information."' 1 5 The patient's involuntary confinement diminished his capacity to give consent even if he
understood the nature of the procedure.10 6 In addition, the court stated
that if the patient is incompetent to give consent to experimental psychosurgery, his guardian is likewise incompetent to give consent for
him. 107

Knowledge of the benefits and hazards of the proposed surgery and
difficulties in recuperation could not be acquired because, according to
the court, medical science was not sufficiently advanced to state with
certainty what relationship, if any, exists between the part of the brain
98 1 MENTAL DISABILITY L. REP. 147, summarized at 42 U.S.L.W. 2063 (Mich. Cir. Ct.

1973).
99 Id. at
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 Id. at
103 Id. at
104 Id. at
105 Id. at
106 Id.
107 Id.

151.

147-48.
153.
150-51.
150.
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proposed for surgery and the subject's subsequent behavior. 0 8 The
court concluded that as psychosurgery is experimental and the benefits
of the proposed procedure were uncertain at best, 0 9 the knowledge requirement of informed consent was not satisfied. Finally, the court evaluated the element of voluntariness and found that the patient, due to his
involuntary confinement, could not exercise his power of free choice and
110
therefore could not voluntarily choose to undergo psychosurgery.
Kaimowitz is significant because it is the first judicial analysis of informed consent in the context of experimental psychosurgery. 1 For the
first time, limitations were placed on physician experimenters using radical medical technologies as a last resort to control extreme behavioral
problems.' 12 Kaimowitz is also significant for its recognition of the individual's right to mental integrity as an essential aspect of the right to
13
privacy. 1
B.

DEVELOPMENT OF FDA REGULATIONS

It is important to understand that regulation of human experimentation in the United States is controlled by two major agencies of the
federal government, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and the
Public Health Service-National Institutes of Health (PHS-NIH) complex. The purposes of these two agencies are entirely different, and their
impact upon research has significant variations. The FDA is productoriented. It is charged with regulation of pharmaceutical corporations
and other business firms which engage in manufacture and distribution
of medicinal drugs and cosmetics for profit. These enterprises are highly
competitive, and the primary purpose of the agency is to protect the
consumer by making sure that products are safe for the public and by
protecting the public's rights during investigations to determine the efficacy of products. Exceptions to FDA regulations are allowed only in
accordance with the exemptions established by statute," t 4 and controls
are applied uniformly throughout the nation.
The National Institutes of Health (NIH), by contrast, is not a regulatory agency. Its responsibilities relate mainly to the support of a na108 Id. at 148.
109 Id. at 149.

110 Id. at 151.
111 Note, supra note 31, at 953.
112 Peters & Lee,,supra note 31, at 383.
113 Id. at 390. The Kaimowitz decision has come under serious criticism. It may, in fact,
hinder a patient's right to treatment. See Wexler, MentatHealth and the Movement Toward Volunta y Treatment, 62 CAL. L. REV. 671 (1974). See generaly G. ANNAS, L. GLANTz & B. KATZ,
INFORMED CONSENT TO HuMAN EXPERIMENTATION (1977); D. WEXLER, MENTAL HEALTH
LAW: MAJOR ISSUES (1981).
114 21 C.F.R. §§ 312.1-312.10 (1980).
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tional program of health science research' n 5 NIH is a respected
member of the scientific community, with which it shares philosophies
and aspirations. Its own policy is to encourage academic freedom and
creativity in research by its extramural project grants. The primary interest of NIH is in the best possible scientific results, and it considers the
patient-subject a valuable partner in this endeavor. Instead of a confining and substantive regulatory program, NIH has developed a decentralized system of local institutional review committees which rely on
ethical guidelines instead of specific regulations to protect the patientsubjects of the projects it supports. However, NIH assumes direct responsibility for protecting research subjects through its own system of
central review of project applications. 116 NIH has developed a system of
law-producing mechanisms based upon elightened and conscientious
self-government by its investigators. In the early 1950s significant efforts
to establish codes for human research were made in reaction to the prin-

ciples announced in Fortner v. Koch. 1 17 Despite those early attempts at
codification and the impetus of Nuremberg and Helsinki, no comprehensive federal code for human experimentation was created.' 18
Amid the failure to take an affirmative stand on human experimentation, the world was shocked by the outbreak of infantile deformity in
Western Europe in 1961 and 1962 as a result of the use of thalidomide
by pregnant woment. The tragedy took place while drug companies
were being investigated by Senator Estes Kefauver's Subcommittee on
Antitrust and Monopoly.1 19 When the request for permission to study
Thalidomide as a new drug was withdrawn in March 1962, the FDA
undertook to recall the drug. Although the FDA initially believed that
only forty or fifty doctors in the United States had the drug for testing, it
discovered that by August 1962, over 2100 kilograms of tablets had been
distributed to some 1,231 investigators, who had prescribed the drug to
115 Curran, supra note 88, at 570-89.
116 Id. at 586-88.
117 In 1903, 1912, 1949 and 1957 the American Medical Association published revisions of

its Code of Ethics, which governs the physician's conduct in relation to his patient and describes accepted attitudes toward clinical experimentation. In 1966 the A.M.A. approved the
principles of human experimentation established by the World Medical Association in Helsinki in 1964 and added several regulations of its own, which may have influenced the early
rules of conduct promulgated by the Food and Drug Administration and National Institutes
of Health. Id. at 564-65.
118 In 1961, Dr. Louis G. Welt received responses from sixty-six university medical departments (out of eighty-six questioned) in the United States regarding an inquiry whether they
had established some formal procedure for human experimentation. Only eight answered
that some sort of "procedural document" dealing with potential problems in this area existed
at their institution. Welt, Reflctions on the Problnm of Human Expeimentation, 25 CONN. MED.
75, 77-78 (1961).
119 Hearings of this subcommittee had begun on December 7, 1959, and were in progress
at the time of the Thalidomide tragedy.
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19,822 patients, including some 3,760 women of child-bearing age.1 20
None of this activity was unlawful, since the existing FDA statute12 ' (in
force since 1938) merely required application for use of new drugs on the
market and permitted their distribution for investigation to clinical investigators if the drug carried the label: "Caution-New Drug-Limited by federal law to investigational use." Equipped with this
information on Thalidomide, the Kefauver hearings resulted in the
Kefauver-Harris Bill, known as the Drug Amendments of 1962,122
23
which became the basis for the present FDA regulations.1
Under the 1938 statute, the FDA required only that the drug man124
ufacturers seek an investigational-use exemption to study a new drug.
Notice of actual shipments, information of research protocol or the qualifications, number or locations of investigators was kept by the FDA.
However, because the agency was relatively limited in personnel and
scope, it was forced to confine its activities largely to reviewing new drug
applications before permitting them to enter the general market. The
FDA's approach was the result of previous experience with public distribution of elixir-sulfanilamide which had led to requirements for testing
25
drug toxicity on animals before marketing.
The Drug Amendments of 1962 radically changed the role of the
FDA from the simple monitor of drug safety into the arbiter of value,
quality and success in experimentation with drugs. The 1962 amendments required not only that drugs be safe for public consumption but
also that there be "substantial evidence" of effective therapeutic value,
supported by "well controlled investigation," including clinical studies,
before release of the drug. 126 Drug advertising was controlled more
strictly. Contraindications, precautions and harmful side effects were
120 Lear, The UnfmirhedStogy of Thalidomide, SATURDAY REv., Sept. 1, 1962, at 38. Fortunately the drug was never used extensively in the United States, largely because of withholding of approval by Dr. Frances 0. Kelsey of the FDA's Bureau of Medicine.
121 Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, ch. 675, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938).
122 Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780 (1962) (codified in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.).
123 21 C.F.R. §§ 310.3-310.304; 312.1-312.20; 314.235 (1980).
124 Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, ch. 675, § 505, 52 Stat. 1052 (1938).
125 jurow, Govement and Cosumer Potection-Degs,22 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 593, 597
(1967). Introduction of sulfanilamide had resulted in cases of kidney shutdown secondary to
use of the drug. This was the country's first experience with drug toxicity in an agent that
had great therapeutic value. (Sulfa drugs predated penicillin and were the first successful
systemic antibiotics capable of combatting deadly infections in humans). Since clinical observations quickly demonstrated that renal complications could be reduced by the simple expedient of alkalinizing the patient with sodium bicarbonate or other suitable alkalis and by
providing him with ample oral fluid intake, the importance of animal toxicity studies in spite
of the urgent need for a drug became apparent. Id. at 595. Moreover, the requirement for
such studies set the stage for Dr. Kelsey's fortuitous withholding of Thalidomide from the
drug market.
126 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (1976).
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required on labels. 127 More stringent requirements for new drug applications were established. Comprehensive regulations on clinical testing
of new drugs were formulated. These included keeping adequate
records, reviewing the reports of all preclinical tests, such as animal tests
that might justify clinical testing, and obtaining signed agreements from
clinical investigators indicating that tests would be conducted under
their personal supervision and that the drugs would be distributed to no
128
one other than approved human subjects.
The drafters of the Drug Amendments of 1962, preoccupied with
regulating the testing and marketing of drugs, overlooked the need for
patient-subject consent. This requirement was added by amendment on
the floor of the Senate.1 29 Consent of the subject was made mandatory,
leaving the FDA no discretion in its application of the statute.' 30 There
were, however, two exceptional situations in which consent was not required: (1) if consent was not feasible in the opinion of the investigator
(for example, in an unconscious patient), and (2) if consent was con3
trary to the best interests of the subject.1 '
FDA regulations to implement the Drug Amendments of 1962 required notification of any interstate shipment of investigational drugs
and detailed information on preclinical testing.' 32 The FDA also reserved the right to require the sponsor of the tests on investigational
drugs to submit complete clinical data and to withhold further testing if
the preclinical testing data did not support the safety or efficacy of the
drug. 133 Moreover, the sponsor could also be required to discontinue
new drug shipments if any investigator repeatedly or deliberately failed
to maintain or make available his records on or reports of
investigations. '34
The FDA regulations further established three phases of clinical investigation. '35 Phases I and II deal with clinical-pharmacological evaluation of drugs on humans. A general outline is required identifying the
investigator(s), the hospital or research facility where the study is done,
the expert committee or panels to be used for supervision, the maximum
number of subjects needed and the estimated duration of the pharmacological studies.' 36 These regulations provide adequate safeguards
127
128
129
130
13'
132
133

Id.
Id. § 355(i) (1976).
108 CONG. REC. 17364, 17391, 17395 (1962) (remarks of Sen. Javits).
21 U.S.C. § 355(i) (1976).
Id.
21 C.F.R. §§ 310.3-310.304; 312.1-312.20; 314.1-314.235 (1980).
Id. § 312.1(a)(2) (1980).

134 Id. § 312.1(a)(8) (1980).

135 Id. § 312.1(a)(2) (1980).
136 Id.
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against ethical problems even though this is not the regulation's primary
purpose. Furthermore, the regulations no longer allow the sponsor to
unduly prolong distribution of drugs for investigational use. Once the
initial period for distribution has expired investigation must either be
137
discontinued or a new drug application must be filed.
In the Phase III testing, which is the final clinical testing before
marketing, the sponsor must submit a protocol developed on the basis of
the facts accumulated in the earlier phases, including completed animal
studies.138 For compliance with this phase, the following data are required: planned clinical observations, specific laboratory tests, names
and addresses of investigators, the approximate number of subjects, and
the estimated duration of clinical trials and intervals. The clinical trials
cannot exceed one year. Phase III testing usually requires more than
one independent investigator, and mandates that each investigator keep
adequate records on each subject treated. A "full statement" is necessary on any adverse effect, together with a statement of opinion as to
139
whether or not such an effect is attributable to the drug under study.
If the adverse effect of a drug is "alarming," the sponsor must be informed immediately, and he must then report to the FDA. The sponsor
is also required to report discontinuation of a drug study along with the
reasons for doing so. 140 If Phase III studies proceed satisfactorily, periodic reports to the FDA are required.141 Investigational use cannot be
142
unduly prolonged without requiring a new drug application.
The requirement for patient-subject consent became a matter of
specific regulation and definition. The term "informed consent" was
eliminated in order to avoid confusion with the term as it is used in
medical malpractice. The use is inapplicable in studies of new experimental drugs, the effects of which are not entirely known or predictable.
In formulating its definition, the FDA used the concepts of Nuremberg
and Helsinki, in addition to the rules formulated by the Ethical Guidelines for Clinical Research and adopted by the American Medical Association on November 30, 1966.143 The definition of consent in the
regulations is as follows:
'Consent'. . .means that the person involved has legal consent, is so situ137 Id. §312.1(a)(4) (1980).
138

Id. § 312.1(a)(2) (1980).

139 Id.
140 Id. § 312.1(a)(6) (1980). Such findings include significant hazards, side effects, contraindications, and precautions pertinent to the safety of the drug.

141 Id. §
142 Id.

312.1(a)(5) (1980).

143 Curran, supra note 88, at 564-65. See also notes 58-67 & accompanying text supra for
World MedicalAssociation, Declaration of Helsinki and American Medical Association Ethical
Guidelines for Clinical Investigation (1966).
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ated as to be able to exercise free power of choice, and is provided with a
fair explanation of all material information concerning the administration
of the investigational drug, or his possible use as a control, as to enable him
to make an understanding decision as to his willingness to receive said investigational drug. This latter element requires that before the acceptance
of an affirmative decision by such person, the investigator should make
known to him the nature, duration and purpose of the administration of
said investigational drug; the method and means by which it is to be administered, all inconveniences and hazards reasonably to be expected, including the fact, where applicable, that the person may be used as a
control; the existence of alternative forms of therapy, if any; and the effects
upon his health or person that may possibly come from the administration
of the investigational drug. Said patient's consent shall be obtained in
writing by the investigator. 144
Time and usage have resulted in some slight changes in the wording of this definition,1 45 but the effect and implications remain essentially unchanged. Written consent of Phase III subjects has beenrelaxed, provided the investigator certifies on the patient's medical record that consent requirements have been fulfilled.' 46 The definition of
consent was not intended to eliminate the "double blind" study, 14 7 but
it clearly envisions informing the subject that he may be used as a control rather than as a subject who actually receives the investigational
144
145

21 C.F.R. § 310.102(h) (1980).
In 32 Fed. Reg. 3994 (1967) (codified in 21 C.F.R. § 130), consent is defined as follows:

'Consent' means that the person involved has legal capacity to give consent, is so
situated as to be able to exercise free power of choice, and is provided with a fair explanation of pertinent information concerning the investigational drug, and/or his possible
use as a control, as to enable him to make a decision on his willingness to receive said
investigational drug. This latter element means that before acceptance of an affirmative
decision by such person the investigator should carefully consider and make known to
him (taking into consideration such person's wellbeing and his ability to understand) the
nature, expected duration, and purpose of the administration of said investigational
drug; the method and means by which it is to be administered; the hazards involved; the
existence of alternative forms of therapy, if any; and the beneficial effects upon his health
or person that may possibly come from the administration of the investigational drug.
When consent is necessary under the rules set forth in this section, the consent of
persons receiving an investigational new drug in Phase 1 and Phase 2 investigations (or
their representatives) shall be in writing. When consent is necessary under such rules in
Phase 3 investigations, it is the responsibility of the investigators, taking into consideration the physical and mental state of the patient, to decide when it is necessary or preferable to obtain consent in other than written form. When such written consent is not
obtained, the investigator must obtain oral consent and record that fact in the medical
record of the person receiving the drug.
146

Id.

"Double blind" studies are done to insure accuracy of results. Neither the investigator
nor the patient knows whether the patient is receiving the experimental drug or a placebo.
After the drug has been administered and observations taken, someone, preferably a neutral
person, determines who has received the new drug and who has received the placebo. This
procedure leads to relatively accurate assessment of the experimental new drug. Bowker,
supra note 1, at 164-65. See also Weinstein, Allocation ofSubjects in MedicalExperiments, 291 NEw
147

ENGLANDJ. MED.

1278, 1279 (1974).
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drug. The two exceptions, 148 the comatose patient and the patient who
does not understand or whose best interests preclude obtaining consent,
have been increasingly interpreted to mean that these patients should be
removed from investigational studies, unless their condition justifies administration of such drugs as a final therapeutic life-saving measure.
Research in seriously ill or terminal patients is not encouraged. 149 These
statutory regulations on drug investigation are applied universally.
C.

DEVELOPMENT OF NIH GUIDELINES AND CONTROL SYSTEMS

The National Institues of Health began with the establishment of
the National Cancer Institute in 1937 and with it the beginning of extramural awards to qualified researchers in the United States outside of
NIH. Both NIH and the extramural grants for research and education
grew in number and importance until, by 1979, some $3.2 billion were
appropriated for research activities and grant support. 150 The NIH is
not a regulatory agency. It conducts its own research programs and supports other responsible institutions and investigators in order to maintain a national program of health science research. One of the most
important contributions of NIH is its establishment of a unique system
of ethical guidelines for the use of human subjects in clinical
investigations.
NIH is staffed at all levels by experienced scientists and administrators and has become an integral part of the scientific community. It has
always respected the scientist's insistence upon intellectualfreedom and
to this end has traditionally not interfered with institutional policies
concerning faculty appointments, staff salaries or terms of employment.
Decisions on publications of findings are left to the principal investigators, and much freedom is allowed for changes in research design. How148 Drug Amendments of 1962, 21 § U.S.C. § 355(i) (1976). See also 21 C.F.R. § 310.102

(1980).
149 See generally P. RAMSEV, supra note 79; Martin, supra note 75.
150 Fredrickson, supra note 45, at 512. In addition to the National Cancer Institute, the
Division of Research Grants was established in 1946, the National Heart Institute and the
National Institute of Dental Research in 1948, the Experimental Biology and Medicine Institute and the National Institute of Dental Research in 1948, the National Institute of Mental
Health (which was merged with the Mental Hygiene Program of the Public Health Service)
in 1949, the National Institute of Neurological Diseases and Blindness and the National Institute of Arthritis and Metabolic Disease in 1950; the Clinical Center of NIH in 1953, the
Division of General Medical Sciences in 1963, and the National Eye Institute and the John E.
Fogarty International Center for Advanced Study in 1968. Curran, supra note 88, at 570-71.
The NIH medical research budget increased from $17 million in 1948 to $803 million in
1967 and rose to $1.2 billion in 1968. DIVISION OF RESEARCH GRANTS, NIH, BASIC DATA
RELATING TO THE NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH 6 (1968). In 1977 actual funds appropriated for NIH amounted to $2.5 billion, and in 1979, the proposed budget was $2.9 billion.
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, THE BUDGET, Fiscal Year 1979, 342.
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ever, NIH bears the ultimate responsibility for ensuring competent,
effective research and for protecting the rights of human subjects.
Concern by NIH for ethical standards in human experimentation
began in 1953 when the Clinical Center in Bethesda, Maryland, set
forth a set of principles and procedures. At first, those requirements
were met formally, but as patient-subjects came to be regarded as integral members of the research team, they were as fully informed as possible of the investigations contemplated, particularly as to potential
hazards.151 If an unusual risk was involved, the patient-subject was
asked to submit a written consent or to indicate in a separate memorandum his understanding of the procedure and its purpose, his understanding of potential dangers to himself and his willingness to
participate in the investigation. 152
Because of the interest generated by NIH policies and the experience at the Clinical Center, an ad hoc study group was formed in 1964
to consider in greater depth the advisability of applying ethical guidelines to the extramural grants supported by NIH. This committee forwarded a report to the Surgeon General in January 1965, with four
recommendations:
1. That an appropriate inter-professional group should be encouraged to
formulate a statement of principles relating to moral and ethical aspects
and activities.
2. That there is a need for factual information concerning actual research
procedures and activities.
3. That the NIH should consider providing advice, at the request of
grantees, concerning ethical problems and risk-reducing practices in
clinical research.
4. That reasearch grant documentation relating to the use of human subjects in clinical investigation should be identified
for special consideration
1 53
throughout the NIH-PHS review process.
These ethical guidelines were also considered by the National Advisory Health Council when it adopted a resolution in December 1965,
requiring that ". . . support of clinical research and investigation involving human beings should be provided only if the judgment of the
investigator is subject to prior review by his institutional associates to
assure an independent determination of the protection of the rights and
welfare of the individuals involved . . .,154
On February 8, 1966, the Surgeon General issued the following policy statement:
151

Sessoms, Guiding Principles in Medical Research Involving Humans, 32 HosPrrALs 44, 64

(1958).

152 Curran, supra note 88, at 575.
153 Id. at 576.
154

Id.
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No new, renewal or continuation research or research training grant in support of
clinical research and investigation involving human beings shall be awarded by the Public Health Service unless the grantee has indicated in the application the manner in
which the grantee institution will .provide prior review of the judgment of the principal
investigator or program director by a committee of his institutional associates. This review should assure an independent determination: (1) of the rights and welfare of the
individual or individuals involved, (2) of the appropriateness of the methods used to
secure informed consent, and (3) of the risks and potential medical benefits of the invesof the associates who will provide the review
tigation. A description of the committee
155
shall be included in the application.

The Surgeon General's policy was first applied only to research and
research training agents but soon spread to almost all other NIH-supported extramural projects. Initially each grant was required to have
the description of an appropriate local institutional committee responsible for overseeing the principal investigator. Because this requirement
increased "paper work," it was revoked and replaced by one in which an
institution filed an assurance, agreement or compliance only once and
indicated that the review committee would be responsible for overseeing
all grant applications received from investigators at that particular institution. This assurance also carried a description of the review committee or committees in the institution and of the methods used to ensure
compliance with the advice of the review committee. Any changes' in
the committees or their policies had to be reported and reapproved.
In December 1966, the Surgeon General made another policy
change relating to research in the behavioral and social sciences. This
policy made the grantee institution responsible for ensuring that the investigations are "in accordance with the laws of the community in
which the investigations are conducted .... ,,156
The establishment of local institutional review committees had a
profound effect on the participating institutions. Doubt as to the importance which NIH attached to the moral and ethical considerations of
research in human subjects all but vanished. Those concerns were addressed by the fulfillment of three needs: (1) to protect the rights and
welfare of subjects by reviewing the judgment of the investigator and
enforcing compliance with the Committee's recommendations, (2) to
obtain "informed consent" from the experimental subject, and (3) to
assess the risks against the potential benefits of the investigation before
granting approval. 15 7 The third criterion had a salutary effect because
the number of "problem projects"-those posing serious hazards to ex15 8
perimental subjects-fell significantly.
Although NIH did not require that the committees review the ap155
156
157
158

Id. at 577.
Id.
Id. at 578.
Id. at 579-80.
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plications before submission to the NIH review and approval system,
this became the standard practice. Thus, when final approval was
granted to a project, it had first cleared the local review committee and
had received final approval at the NIH level. The requirement that
ultimate responsibility for proper research rest with NIH was fulfilled
without having to resort to the cumbersome system of frequent site visits
and re-evaluation of projects after approval by local committees. Finally, the existence of local review committees charged with responsibility for overseeing NIH projects in a given institution diminished the
authority of other investigators. In time, these investigators sought approval of their projects even though this was not required of research
which did not receive support from NIH. 159
Other benefits from the NIH ethical guidelines have accrued or are
expected. The concept of "informed consent" has been retained by NIH
policy-makers despite the connotation derived from medical malpractice
litigation. 6 0 The concept remains in order to protect a lay person who
may not be fully aware of all the ramifications of the research project in
which he plans to participate despite conscientious explanations to him.
Also, many local committees weigh for themselves the risk-benefit aspects of a project for the patient and may reject the project for him
despite his willingness to accept the risks involved. While the committee
is thereby subjected to added legal hazards, this procedure affords the
overzealous patient an added measure of protection. Although most local review committees continued to be "parochial" in the sense that they
16 1
are composed of other scientists who "understand" one another,
many now include other professionals and thus have broadened the
scope of the local review process. 162 Even laymen are beginning to be
introduced into the review committees to present a totally non-profes159 Id. In view of the indefinite nature of the concepts and terminology concerning the
safeguarding of the patient-subject's rights and safety under experimentation guidelines of the
Nuremberg and Helsinki codes and the FDA and NIH guidelines, the responsibility of local
review committees becomes a matter of prime importance. Since it is doubtful that the concepts and terminology can be more explicitly defined and still be applicable to any given
situation, these local review committees must interpret codes and guidelines in such a manner
as to protect the patient-subject's rights without stifling scientific and medical investigation.
160 See note 70 supr-a.
161 Of 142 local review committees surveyed by the NIH in 1968, 104 (or 73 percent) were
limited to institutional peer groups. Eighteen also included attorneys; sixteen included lay
associates and one included both attorneys and clergy. Eleven had broad interdisciplinary
representation in which the scientific peer group was in a minority. Curran, supa note 88, at
583.
162 There are definite advantages to inclusion of attorneys, philosophers, clergymen, and
local citizens in the deliberations of the review committees. Attorneys can provide special
knowledge in local laws and procedure. Philosophers and clergymen have a serious concern
with ethical issues and human values and may contribute attitudes and convictions not considered by the scientists. Other professionals, businessmen and laymen can play an important
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sional perspective. 16 3
Local review committees represent an effective approach to the development of a kind of common law precedent in the field of human
experimentation. 6 4 However, to harvest the benefits of the experience
accumulated by local review committees, a system for sharing relevant
experiences must be developed. Major difficulties exist because of
problems related to confidentiality and privacy 6 5 and the need to protect the reputation and integrity of researchers, subjects and review
panels. NIH and local review committees must exchange views not only
on their own projects but also about new moral and ethical issues in
human research. Some success has been achieved, 66 but more of the
imaginative administration that led to the founding of local review committees is needed.
ADDITIONAL LEGISLATION REGULATING HUMAN

D.

EXPERIMENTATION AND/OR REVIEW PROCEDURES

The Social Security Act Amendments of 1972167 are the first in a
series of more recent legislative measures designed to regulate human
experimentation, review procedures or both. This statute creates another review system, the Professional Standards Review Organization
(PSRO), whose purpose is to promote:
the effective, efficient and economical delivery of health care services of
proper quality ...

to assure, through the application of suitable proce-

dures of review, that the service for which payment may be made under
the Social Security Act will conform to appropriate professional standards
for the provision of health care ....

168

The PSRO has the responsibility of reviewing all health care services provided under the Social Security Act. Thus, it exerts a significant
influence on the therapeutic relationship. Combined with other provisions which stress economical treatment of patients 169 and restricted adrole in areas concerning community responsibility. Moore, EthicalBoundaries in Initial Clinical
Trials, in EXPERIMENTATION WITH HUMAN SUBJECTS, supra note 38, at 502-03.
163 See generaly Holman & Dutton, A CareforPublicParticipationin Science Poliy Formationand
Practice, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 1505 (1978); Lapp6 & Martin, The Place ofthe Public in the Conduct
ofScience, 51 S. CAL. L. REv. 1535 (1978).
164 See, e.g., Fortner v. Koch, 272 Mich. 273, 261 N.W. 762 (1935).
165 See Gordon, Issues in Human Experimentation, 89 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 846 (1978).
For a discussion of confidentiality in research on human subjects, seegeneral R. BORUCH &J.
CECIL, ASSURING THE CONFIDENTIALITY OF SOCIAL RESEARCH DATA

166
167
168
169

See notes 176-206 & accompanying text infa.
Pub. L. No. 92-603, 86 Stat. 1329 (1972).
Id. § 1151.
This section provides:

(1979).
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mission to health care facilities, especially those for inpatients,170 the
PSRO system is capable of controlling human experimentation performed in a therapeutic relationship. PSRO control is needed because
the type of treatment, the admission to inpatient health facilities, the
length of stay 171 and economic dictates may erode the traditional therapeutic doctor-patient relationship in favor of increased experimentation.
The clinical research aspect of human experimentation may also be affected by the PSRO system since it may utilize or influence local peer
review committees established to review health care and clinical investi72
gations at health care institutions.'
. . . [P]ayment for such services will be made
(1) only when and, to the extent medically necessary, as determined in the exercise
of reasonable limits of professional discretion; and
(2) in the case of services provided by a hospital or other health care facility on an
inpatient basis, only when and for such period as such services cannot, consistent with
professionally recognized health care standards, effectively be provided on an outpatient
basis or more economically in an inpatient health care facility of a different type, as
determined in the exercise of reasonable limits of professional discretion.
Id.
170 This section provides:
Each Professional Standards Review Organizaton shall have the authority to determine, in advance, in case of (A) any elecltive admission to a hospital, or other health care facility, or
(B) any other health care service which will consist of extended or costly courses of
treatment,
whether such service, if provided, or if provided by a particular health care practitioner or by a particular hospital or other health care facility, organization, or agency,
would meet the criteria specified in clauses (A) and (C) of paragraph (1).
Id. § 1155(a)(2).
171 This section provides:
Each Professional Standards Review Organization shall(A) in accordance with regulations of the Secretary, specify the appropriate points
in time after the admission of a patient for inpatient care in a health care institution, at
which the physician attending such patient shall execute a certification stating that further inpatient care in such institution will be medically necessary effectively [sic] to meet
the health care need of such patient; and
(B) require that there be included in any such certification with respect to any patient such information as may be necessary to enable such organization properly to evaluate the medical necessity of the further institutional health care recommended by the
physician executing such certification.
(2) The points in time at which any such certification will be required (usually, not
later than the 50th percentile of lengths-of-stay for patients in similar age groups with
similar diagnoses) ....
Id. § 1156(d).
172 Each Professional Standards Review Organization shall utilize the services of, and
accept the findings of, the review committees of a hospital or other operating health care
facility or organization located in the area served by such organization, but only when
and only to the extent and only for such time that such committees in such hospital or
other operating health care facility or organization have demonstrated to the satisfaction
of such organization their capacity effectively and in timely fashion to review activities in
such hospital or other operating health care facility or organization (including the medical necessity of admissions, types and extent of services ordered, and length of stay) so as
to aid in accomplishing the purposes and responsibilities described in subsection (a)(1)
except where the Secretary disapproves, for good cause, such acceptance.
Id. § 115 5(e)(1).
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A more recent statute is the National Research Service Award Act
of 1974 (NRA).173 The express purpose of this statute is to ensure continued excellence in biomedical and behavioral research and to provide
for protection of human subjects involved in such research. To achieve
continued excellence in research, the Act authorizes the Secretary of the
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to award grants for
research and training in matters relating to the cause, diagnosis, prevention and treatment of disease or other health problems.' 74 Awards and
grants under the Act are subject to review and approval by advisory
councils of NIH and the Alcohol, Drug Abuse and Mental Health
Administration.1

75

The NRA also provides for creation of a commission known as the
National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research.' 76 The Commission was charged with
(1) conducting a comprehensive investigation to ascertain the ethical
principles which underlie the conduct of biomedical and behavioral research, (2) developing guidelines to govern the conduct of such research, and (3) making recommendations to the Secretary of HHS
regarding proper administrative action to apply such guidelines.' 77 In
carrying out its duties, the Commission was to consider the following
matters:
(i) The boundaries between biomedical or behavioral research involving
human subjects and the accepted and routine practice of medicine.
(ii) The role of assessment of risk-benefit criteria in the determination of
the appropriateness of research involving human subjects.
(iii) Appropriate guidelines for the selection of human subjects for participation in biomedical and behavioral research.

(iv) The nature and definition of informed consent in various research
settings.
(v) Mechanisms for evaluating and monitoring the performance of Institutional Review Boards ... 78and appropriate enforcement mechanisms for
carrying out their decision.'
The Commission was also responsible for identifying the requirements necessary for the informed consent of children, prisoners and the
institutionalized mentally infirm before they can participate in human

experimentation. On the basis of these investigations, it was to make
173 Pub. L. No. 93-348, 88 Stat. 342 (1974).

174 Id. § 472.
175 Id. § 472(b)(2).
176 Id. § 201(a) and (b). For a detailed discussion of the related human subjects protection
committee as the principle legal mechanism for assuring protection of the rights and welfare

of human subjects, see DuVal, The Human Subjects Protection Committee: An Experiment in DecentralizedFederalRegulation, 1979 AM. BAR FOUNDATION RESEARCH J. 571.
177 Pub. L. No. 93-348, § 202(a)(1)(A), 88 Stat. 342 (1974).
178

Id. § 202(a)(1)(B).
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recommendations to the Secretary which would assure that research
conducted or supported under programs administered by HHS complied with the Commission's requirements for informed consent. 179 In
addition, it was to conduct a study to determine if a mechanism was
needed to protect human subjects in research not regulated by HHS and
to make appropriate recommendations to Congress. 0 The Commission
was also to conduct an investigation into research on living fetuses and
into the use of psychosurgery and in both cases to recommend to the
Secretary any policies defining the circumstances under which such research may be conducted or supported. 8" Finally, it was to undertake a
comprehensive study of the ethical, social and legal implications of
human experimentation. The study was to include the following:
(1) an analysis and evaluation of scientific and technological advances in
past, present, and projected biomedical and behavioral research and
services;
(2) an analysis and evaluation of the implications of such advances, both
for individuals and for society;
(3) an analysis and evaluation of laws and moral and ethical principles
governing the use of technology in medical practice;
(4) an analysis and evaluation of public understanding of and attitudes
toward such implications and laws and principles; and
(5) an analysis and evaluation of implications for public policy of such
findings as are made by the Commission with respect to advance in biresearch and technology and public attitudes toomedical and behavioral
82
ward such advances.1
The NRA also creates a National Advisory Council for the Protection of Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research. 8 3 Council
members are selected from a variety of professional and academic backgrounds, but three members must have been engaged in human experimentation.' 8 4 The Council's duties include attention to all aspects of
research in human subjects and review of HHS policies and regulations
to determine their effectiveness in gaining compliance with "the basic
ethical principles which should underlie the conduct of such research.
...
185 The Council is then to make appropriate recommenda186
tions. Moreover, the NRA establishes an Institutional Review Board,
under which any "entity" applying under the Act for a grant for research involving human subjects must demonstrate that it has estab179 Id. § 202(a)(2).
180 Id. § 202(a)(3).
181 Id. § 202(b) and (c).
182 Id. § 203.
183 Id. § 211.
184
185
186

Id.
Id. § 211(a).
Id. § 212(a).
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lished a board to review such research in order to protect the rights of
the subjects. 187 Finally, a limitation is placed by the NRA on research
such that HHS may not conduct or support research on a living human
fetus before or after an induced abortion except to ensure the survival of
the fetus. 188
Upon completion of its investigation, the Commission created in
accordance with the NRA submitted several recommendations. 189 First,
it recommended that therapeutic research involving fetuses and pregnant women may be conducted and supported, provided that certain
conventional ethical review procedures and safeguards are followed.
Secondly, nontherapeutic research must pose "minimal or no risk on the
fetus in ulero" and must be aimed at development of important biomedical knowledge that is not obtainable by alternative means. Third, nontherapeutic research in anticipation of abortion must be approved by a
national ethical review body if the research presents special problems. 190
Concerning research using prisoners as subjects, the Commission recommended that a national ethical review body must first be consulted. In
addition the research must fulfill an important social and scientific need,
and the reasons for involving prisoners must be compelling. Fourth, the
conduct of the research should be characterized by a high degree of voluntariness on the part of participants, and institutions should express
their willingness to be involved. Finally, with respect to psychosurgical
procedures, the Commission provisionally adopted the position that
such procedures could be supported and performed under carefully defined conditions. The Commission would approve efforts to evaluate the
safety and efficacy of specific psychosurgical operations, provided that
surgical competence, well-designed evaluations of outcome and adequate protection of patients' rights are assured. Institutional review
boards must also give approval.
The Commission's recommendations are relatively strict regarding
prisoners, relatively permissive regarding psychosurgical procedures and
intermediate regarding fetuses. By law the Commission's recommenda187 Id.
188 Id. § 213. Seegeneraly

Brock, sufira note 81.

189 U.S. NAT'L COMM'N FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJEcTS OF BIOMEDICAL

HEW INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARDS (1978) (Dep't of
H.E.W. Pub. No. (05) 78-0008). Research in children and the institutionalized mentally infirm are still on the Commission's agenda. Id. For a discussion of the changes in legal relations which have taken place between the federal government and research institutions and
investigators as a result of the development of institutional review boards, see Robertson, The
AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH,

Law of InstitutionalReview Boards, 26 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 484 (1979).
190 See also Curran, ErperimentationBecomes a Crime: FetalResearch in Massachusetts, 292 NEW

(1975) (discussing statute intended to prohibit experimentation on live
human fetuses, within womb or outside, but with certain exceptions).
ENGLAND J. MED. 300

1636

M. CHERIFBASSIOUNI ET AL.

[Vol. 72

tions must either be adopted by the Secretary of HHS or reasons must
be given for rejection.
Regulations also have been published by the Secretary of HHS for
protection of human subjects which are applicable to all HHS supported research.' 9 ' Like the NIH-local peer review model, the primary
responsibility for safeguarding the rights of subjects is placed on the institutions which receive HHS funds. HHS requires that Institutional
192
Review Boards (IRB) be established to approve research activities.
The review boards are to consider risk-benefit questions, adequacy of
informed consent and continuing review. 193 In addition, recipients of
HHS funds for research which involves risk to human subjects are required to submit written assurance that they will comply with HHS
guidelines. 194 These regulations also provide for additional protections
pertaining to research involving fetuses, pregnant women and human in
vitro fertilization.1 95 To implement those protections the Secretary is authorized to establish Ethical Advisory Boards (EAB). The mission of the
EAB is to give advice as to whether particular research projects are consistent with the ethical guidelines of HHS. 96 It is further provided that
no application involving human in vitro fertilization may be funded by
HHS until the EAB has reviewed and given advice as to acceptability
1 97
from an ethical standpoint.
The Institutional Review Boards are charged with additional duties concerning research involving fetuses, pregnant women and in vitro
fertilization under the HHS regulations. 198 The IRB must determine
that adequate consideration has been given to the manner of selecting
subjects and that the applicant has adequately provided for the monitoring of the informed consent process.1 99 The regulations further require that animal studies and studies on nonpregnant individuals be
completed before any activity to which the regulations apply may be
undertaken, except to meet the health needs of the mother or fetus or
where the risk to the fetus is minimal. 20 0 Investigators in such activities
are required to refrain entirely from decisions to abort or to determine
the viability of the fetus at the time of abortion. 20 ' In addition, preg191 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.101-46.306 (1980). These regulations were enacted pursuant to 5
U.S.C. § 301 (1975). See also Bryant, supra note 58, at 25.
192 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(a) (1980).
193 Id. § 46.102(b).
194 Id. § 46.104.
195 Id.

§ 46.201.

196 Id. § 46.204(a).
197 Id. § 46.204(d).
198 Id. § 46.205.
199 Id. § 46.205(a)(2).
200 Id. § 46.206(a).
201 Id. § 46.206(a)(3)-(4).
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nant women may not be involved in HHS supported studies unless the
purpose is to meet the health needs of the mother, the risk to the fetus is
minimal and informed -consent has been obtained regarding possible impact on the fetus. 20 2 Although, a fetus in utero can be a research subject,
the risk must be minimal, the purpose of the research must be to meet its
health needs, or the research must be directed at gaining important biomedical knowledge not otherwise obtainable.20 3 However, the parents
must give their informed consent. 20 4 Finally, no fetus ex utero may be a
subject unless it is viable, as defined by regulation, there is no added risk
or the study involves important knowledge that cannot be obtained by
other means.2 0 5 However, a nonviable fetus may be a research subject if
(1) its vital functions are not artificially maintained, (2) experimental
activities which would themselves terminate the vital functions of the
fetus are not used and (3) the purpose of the activity is to develop im20 6
portant biomedical knowledge not otherwise obtainable.
In general, viable fetuses and pregnant women enjoy relatively
strict protections under the HHS regulations, but those protections yield
more easily in the case of nonviable fetuses, which are more likely to be
aborted. 20 7 Even though investigators are required to refrain from decisions to abort or to determine viability, non-investigator physicians are
not so prohibited. Working in concert with investigators, they may furnish experimental subjects and thereby circumvent the HHS regulation,
thus sacrificing the right of aborted fetuses to be free from experimentation. Legalization of abortion was never contemplated for this
20
purpose. 3
The FDA also has continued to focus its attention on human experimentation by issuing guidelines for clinical evaluation of drugs and
20 9
their impact upon the development of new anti-infective agents.
Those guidelines contain general principles and specific advice. They
are intended to facilitate the planning and conduct of research without
unduly confining innovation or technological advancement. They are
recommendations of desirable approaches and appropriate methods for
202
203
204
205

Id. § 46.207.
Id. § 46.208(a).
Id. § 46.208(b).
Id. § 46.209(a). See also note 74 & accompanying text supra.
206 45 C.F.R. § 46.209(a)(l)-(2).
207 See P. RAMSEY, supra note 79, at 37-40; Martin, supra note 75, at 568-69; notes 79-81 &
accompanying text supra.
208 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (balancing required between pregnant woman's right to
obtain safe, inexpensive, and nonintrusive abortion and right of state to protect maternal
health and fetal life). See a/so Powledge & Fletcher, Guidelinesfor the Ethical, Socialand Legal
Issues in PrenatalDiagnosir, 300 NEw ENGLAND J. MED. 168, 170-71 (1979).
209 Crout, Guidelines of the Food and Drug Administrationfor Study ofNew Drugs in Human Subjects, 89 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 832 (1978).
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conduct of clinical research on drugs in humans.2 10 Under FDA regulations, all clinical guidelines represent formal agency advice. Research
initiated in good faith under the guidelines will be accepted for review
purposes unless a guideline is formally rescinded for valid health reasons. 21 1 One such FDA guideline relates to general evaluation of drugs
in humans.2 12 Another considers evaluation of drugs in infants and children.2 13 The former contains an introductory section dealing with principles of review by the Institutional Review Board, informed consent
and design of controlled trials. It also states objectives, provides for
preclinical testing of drugs and provides for testing during the investigational phases 2 14 for determining drug efficacy.
The expanding field of human experimentation is viewed with concern in the United States. Various legislative responses have been fashioned in an effort to impart order to this expansion so that necessary
growth of scientific knowledge will continue. Legislation also has sought
to counterbalance the effect of the growth in human experimentation by
protecting subjects who might otherwise suffer injury in the experimental process.
VI.

INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE ASPECTS OF
HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION

A.

PAST INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE AND COOPERATION

In order to establish a practical and desirable foundation for international control of human experimentation, it is necessary to examine
the attitudes of other nations, past international cooperation and the
efforts of international scientific, medical, and other professional organizations. Through such analysis a valid determination of the need for
and success of a proposal for international cooperation and commitment
can be made. Regardless of the public concern and medical and scientific committment that seems to prevail in the United States, there can
be little hope for effective international control if such attitudes do not
exist internationally.
The scant interest in regulating human experimentation in the
United States prior to 1960 existed throughout the world until the revelations at Nuremberg. Few countries had enacted regulations or developed legal precedent, nor was there an international medical association
210 Id.
211 21 C.F.R. § 10.90(b) (1980).
212 FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE CLINICAL EVALUATION
OF DRUGS IN INFANTS AND CHILDREN (1977) (Dep't of

213 Id. (Dep't of HEW Pub. No. 77-3041).
214 See notes 135-49 & accompanying text supra.

HEW Pub. No. 77-3040).
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to establish guidelines based on a consensus of world opinion. Doctors
and scientific investigators were forced to rely upon their own moral
judgment and their interpretation of the Hippocratic Oath. Depending
on their individual training, the exigencies of the situation and the political climate in which they functioned, such judgment did not always
lead to acceptable ethical conduct (viewed in light of contemporary
standards). Still, ethically unacceptable experiments were infrequent,
and it remained for the Nazi atrocities revealed at Nuremberg to provide the impetus for widespread discussion and the formulation of national standards and internationally acceptable guidelines concerning
human experimentation.
The Nuremberg tribunal focused public attention, as well as that of
the medical and scientific professions, on the horrors conducted in the
name of scientific inquiry under the Nazi regime. With the knowledge
of Hitler and at the instigation of Heinrich Himmler, ReichsfUhrer of
the S.S., and other members of the high command, those experiments
were carried out, under the direction or organization of the various physicians in positions of authority in the Nazi regime,2 5 upon unknown
numbers of prisoners in the concentration camps. Though not an exthaustive list, some of the experiments and projects included the following: (1) immersion in tanks of cold water of varying temperatures for
periods up to fourteen hours to develop techniques for rapid and complete resuscitation of German pilots downed at sea; (2) simulation of
high altitude atmospheric conditions in decompression chambers, with
autopsies then performed to study the effect of sudden pressure changes
on the body; (3) attempted mass sterilization through castration doses
of x-rays, treated diet and intrauterine injections apparently of silver
nitrate, (4) multilation of prisoners as experimental surgical subjects for
the training of German surgical students; (5) injection of virulent typhus into prisoners to ensure a ready supply of virus for typhus experiments; (6) infliction of bullet wounds and incisions and introduction of
bacteria into the wounds to study and treat infections; (7) shooting of
prisoners with poisonous aconite bullets to study the effects of aconite
poisoning; (8) forced ingestion of seawater into prisoners to test
desalinzation processes; (9) experimental bone transplantation; (10) ex215 Dr. Karl Brandt held the highest medical position in Germany, that of Reich Commissioner for Health and Sanitation, and had supervisory authority over all military and civilian
medical services. General Siegfried Handloser was the chief of medical services of the
Wehrmacht. General Oskar Schroeder was chief of the medical services of the Luftwaffe. Dr.
Karl Gebhardt was president of the German Red Cross. Dr. Paul Rostock was dean of the
medical faculty of the University of Berlin, and Gerhard Rose was an internationally known
specialist in tropical medicine. The other doctors were mainly staff doctors or consultants
alleged to have direct contact with medical experiments. J. APPLEMAN, supra note 47, at 141-

42.
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ecution and dismemberment of prisoners to furnish "subhuman" skeletal specimens for an anthropological museum; and (11) injection of
malaria to test malaria immunity.2

16

While experiments involving

and high-altitude conditions 2 19 were conducted in the United States, such experiments were either performed
solely on animals or were tested on animals before controlled experiments with appropriate safeguards were instituted on human subjects.
Furthermore, in the United States the subjects were volunteers who, unlike their concentration camp counterparts, could refuse to participate
in the experiment.
The twenty-three defendants in the Medical Case of the Nuremberg tribunal were tried by an international Military Tribunal under
Control Council Order No. 10,220 and, of the sixteen defendants found
guilty, fifteen were convicted of committing war crimes and crimes
against humanity. 2 2 1 As part of its decision in the Medical Case, the
Tribunal promulgated the Articles of the Nuremberg Tribunal as guidedesalinization, 2 17

malaria, 2 18

216 Id. at 142-43; Enloe, supra note 46, at 801-03; Mellanby, supra note 46, at 148-49.
217

Enloe, supra note 46, at 803.

218 Id. at 803-04.
219 Id. at 802.
220 The Tribunal was established by the London Agreement of August 8, 1945, pursuant to

all previous declarations regarding war criminals and was signed by the United States, the
Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and France "acting in the interest of all the United Nations." Article 6 of the Charter annexed to the London Agreement defined the crimes which
came within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, as did Order No. 10 promulgated later by the
Control Council for Germany. Bierzanek, The Prosecution of War Crimes, in INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 5, at 575-76. Establishment of such tribunals is an accepted practice under existing international law. J. APPLEMAN, supra note 47, at 12-13.
221 War crimes encompass violations of the laws and customs of war. Crimes against humanity include murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts
committed against any civilian population, before or during a war, or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime within the
jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the country
where perpetrated. These categories were so defined in the Charter annexed to the London
Agreement, in Control Council Order No. 10 (art. 2) and in the Charter of the Tokyo Tribunal (art. 5). Bierzanek, supra note 220, at 576. Of the fifteen defendants guilty of a least these
two crimes, seven were put to death, five were sentenced to life imprisonment, two were sentenced to twenty years imprisonment, and one was sentenced to fifteen years imprisonment.
J. APPLEMAN, supra note 47, at 139-40. Petitions to the United States Supreme Court for
review of these sentences were denied for lack of jurisdiction, a further recognition of the
international character of the judgments. Brandt v. United States, 333 U.S. 836 (1948). See,
e.g., In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946), in which criminal liability involving the death penalty was imposed for failure to supervise subordinates. The Supreme Court held that defendant was properly convicted because of "an affirmative duty to take such means as were within
his power and appropriate in the circumstances to protect prisoners of war and civilian populations." But as argued by the dissent, this case lacked a clear resolution of the basis for
liability for an omission. The trial proceedings failed to make clear whether defendant was
convicted on the basis of his knowledge that atrocities had been committed by his subordinates or based on his negligence in not having such knowledge. See Hughes, Criminal Omissions, 67 YALE L.J. 590, 635-36 (1958).
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lines for the legality of human experimentation. 222 Thus, the Nuremberg tribunal was an event of primary importance to human
experimentation for three reasons: (1) it was the first example of cooperation; (2) it set forth the first internationally acceptable guidelines for
such experimentation; (3) it focused the attention of the world community on the possible consequences of unethical and uncontrolled human
experimentation, thereby providing the impetus to nations and national
and international professional associations to formulate acceptable
criteria.
Of the thirteen Nuremberg trials, historians have subsequently
found room for disagreement with the verdicts of the Nuremberg tribunal in all the decisions except those involving the medical crimes. To
date, significant world opinion has not come to the defense of the nature
or manner in which the experiments were conducted in the Nazi concentration camps. Scientific achievement and the power of the scientific
community to make drastic biological changes in human beings had by
World War II, reached a point at which this power needed regulation
by the world community.
The Articles of the Nuremberg Tribunal were generally accepted
throughout the world as furnishing reasonable guidance for human experimentation, although problems arose concerning the application of
certain principles. 223 The main target for criticism was Article 1, which
requires that an experiment be performed only after obtaining the voluntary consent of a subject who has the legal capacity to consent after
that subject has been informed of the possible risks of the experiment.
The objection has been raised that such a requirement would effectively
curtail the use of the placebo 224 and the study of mental illness and children's diseases. 225 Questions have also been raised as to the desirability
of informing the subject of all available information, the inability to
inform him completely of the risks of the experiment because of the uncertain nature of the experiment, and the legal capacity of normal
healthy volunteers (such as prisoners, students or assistants) to give consent in certain experiments and under certain conditions. 226 Article 2,
which states that the experiment should "yield fruitful results for the
good of society" and that the experiment should not be "random and
222
223
224
225

See note 56 & accompanying text supra.
See notes 66-87 & accompanying text supra.
Beecher, supra note 53, at 472-73.
Id. at 472; Bowker, Legal Liability to Volunteers Testing New Drugs, 88 CAN. MED. AS'N J.

745, 748-49 (1963).
226 Beecher, supra note 53, at 472-73; Beeson, Bondy, Donnelly & Smith, supra note 56, at
458-62; Bowker, supra note 225, at 748; Welt, Reflections on the ProblemsofHuman Experirentation,
in CLINICAL INVESTIGATION IN MEDICINE: LEGAL, ETHICAL AND MORAL ASPECTS 126, 129

(I. Ladimer & R. Neuman eds. 1963).
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unnecessary in nature" also has been attacked because of its undesirable
connotations. Article 3, which concerns the justification for performance of the experiment, has been questioned on the basis of the investigator's inability to guarantee success. 22 7 Article 5, regarding
experiments involving possible death or disabling injury and the investigator serving as a subject, has been criticized as being too strongly
worded and too strict a requirement. 228 Moreover, the concept of
weighing the degree of risk against the humanitarian importance of the
problem (Article 6) has been criticized as presumptuously evaluating the
2 29
ultimate significance of one's own research.
Imperfect as the language or fundamental principles may seem, the
Nuremberg code established the first internationally accepted safeguards and guidelines for the conduct of human experimentation. The
Code remains a viable force. It squarely acknowledges the scientist's
responsibility for the respect of human rights.
With World War II and the Nuremberg tribunal providing the
foundation for discussion and evaluation, the world community soon
took steps toward the further establishment of safeguards for human
rights in general and human experimentation in particular. At the Annual Assembly in Geneva in 1948, the World Medical Association, a
newly formed organization that was the first body ever "to bring a substantial number of the doctors of the world together to think and act
concertedly, '230 formulated its Decla ation of Geneva, a restatement of
the basic principles of medical condubt intended to update the Hippocratic Oath. Among the pledges it set forth for a physician are these:
I solemnly pledge myself to consecrate my life to the service of humanity ....

The health of my patient will be my first consideration; .

.

.I

will maintain the utmost respect for human life from the time of concepI will not use any medical knowledge contrary to
tion; even under threat,
23
the law of humanity. '

This pledge has gained increasing acceptance and has been incorporated into the written codes of ethics of many national medical
232
associations.
In 1952 Pope Pius XII delivered a speech in which he expressed the
227 Beecher, supra note 53, at 474; Clegg, Human Experimentation, 7 WORLD MED. J. 77, 78
(1960); Welt, supra note 226, at 129-30.
228 Beeson, supra note 57, at 474; Welt, supra note 226, at 130. This principle was found to
have been regarded too casually by Drs. Mandel and Southam at the Brooklyn Jewish Chronic Disease Hospital, Hyman v. Jewish Chronic Disease Hospital, 21 App. Div. 2d 495, 251
N.Y.S.2d 818 (1964).
229 Welt, supra note 226, at 130.
230 The Declarationof Geneva, 1948: A 1971 Reappraisal, 2 MED. J. AUSTL. 735 (1971).
231 Id.
232 Id.
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position of the Roman Catholic Church relative to human experimentation and the moral limits involved. 23 3 Stating that there is a "moral
limit to the doctor's action taken with the consent of the patient" and
that the moral law "sets up limits to the 'medical interest of the patient,' "the Pope explained that there are serious limitations on the consent of the patient, as viewed by the Church. 23 4 This position has
remained basically unchanged, and, though clothed in religious terms, it
remains as a universal law governing the respect of human rights over
and above scientific achievement.
In 1954, the World Medical Association, at its Eighth General Assembly in Rome, adopted the Principles for Those in Research and Experimentation. 23 5 These five basic principles stress that
(1) experimentation should be conducted only in a scientific manner by
qualified individuals who adhere to general rules of respect for the individual's rights; (2) operations or treatment of a daring nature may be
performed on sick patients only in desperate cases; (3) the researcher
bears primary responsibility in human experimentation; (4) informed
consent must be obtained in writing for experimentation on both sick
and healthy patients and (5) publication of the first results of experimentation should be done with prudence and discretion to avoid the
236
detrimental effects of premature and unjustified statements.
In the following year, the Public Health Council of the Netherlands
submitted its Report on Human Experimentation to that nation's Minister of Social Affairs and Health. 23 7 In addition to defining and discussing various aspects of human experimentation, such as the approval of
the subject, risk involved, responsibility, justifiability and dangerous experiments, the Council recommended numerous guarantees and standards, the more noteworthy of which are the following:
1) A recommendation for the study of publications to avoid unnecessary
repetition of experiments;
233 Address by Pope Pius XII: Moral Limits of Medical Research and Treatment, First
International Congress on Histopathology of the Nervous System (Sept. 14, 1952), in Beecher,
supra note 53, at 470, 473, 475.
234 The first such limitation is that although the individual does not possess the right to
destroy or mutilate his body, he may allow parts of it to be destroyed or mutilated in order to
preserve the good of his being as a whole. Secondly, an individual may participate as a
subject in scientific investigations, only so long as such investigations do not violate superior
values, such as the doctor-patient relationship and the patient's right to the physical and

moral integrity of his body and soul. Id. See Giuseppe, Human Expeimentation-A World Problternfrom the Stanwpoint of SpiritualLeaders, 7 WORLD MED. J. 80 (1960).
inctilesfor Those in Research andExperimentation, 2 WORLD
235 World Medical Association,
MED. J. 14 (1955).
236
237

Id. at 14-15.
Public Health Council of the Netherlands, Report on Human Expermentation, in CINcAL

INvEsTIGATION IN MEDICINE, supra note 226, at 154-58.
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2) The investigator should consult other experts on the research project in
order to intensify the sense of responsibility;
3) If considerable risk is involved, the experiment is not in accord with the
object and purpose of medicine;
4) A practicing physician should not become an investigator on his own
patient, if the experiment involves danger. A body of advisors should be
consulted;
5) Experiments on institutionalized old people and children and on the
insane, or on prisoners, which involves dangerous risks, inconvenience or
pain are not approved. All experiments on the dying under any circumstances are disapproved;
6) The "utmost restraint" must be exercised in experiments on patients
deemed to have an incurable malady, even though they volunteer as
subjects;
7) Publication of articles describing human experiments that are contrary
to medical ethics is strongly criticized; and it is recommended that medical
journals refuse to publish articles based on unethical experiments; and
8) To interpret and apply these principles and standards, the Committee
advisory committee of men exrecommends establishment of a permanent
23 8
perienced in human experimentation.
The World Medical Association later presented a summary of this report specially prepared for it.239
In September, 1961, the Ethical Committee of the World Medical
Association formulated its provisional conclusions from its study of experiments involving humans and presented them in a Draft Code of
Ethics on Human Experimentation to the General Assembly of the
World Medical Association.2 40 This draft version was later modified
and prefaced by a general statement on medical ethics and the necessity
of research in medicine. The final version was accepted at the meeting
of the World Medical Association at Helsinki in 1964 and is known as
the Code of Ethics on Human Experimentation of the World Medical
24 1
Association.
A brief comparison between the draft version and the final version
is useful, since it can be assumed that any modifications, deletions or
additions were done purposely, possibly as a result of international dialogues in the interim. Provisions in the final version not stated in the
draft version are:
1) Clinical research cannot legitimately be carried out unless the importance of the objective is in proportion to the inherent risk to the subject.
2) In the purely scientific application of clinical research carried out on a
238 Id.
239 Public Health Council of Netherlands, Human Expeuimentation, 4 WORLD MED. J. 299

(1957).
240 World Medical Association, Draft Code ofEthics on Human Experimentation, 2 BRIT. MED.
J. 1119 (1962).
241 See notes 57-65 & accompanying text supra.
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human being it is the duty of the doctor to remain the protector of the life
and health of that person on whom clinical research is being carried out;
and
3) Consent should as a rule be obtained in writing. However, the responsibility for clinical research always remains with the research worker; it
never falls on the subject, even after consent is obtained.
The draft version explicitly stated that a doctor could extend an
experiment beyond the possible benefit of his patient or combine clinical
research with the personal care of the patient solely for the acquisition of
knowledge, only if the full consent of the patient has been previously
obtained. However, the final version provided that a doctor could combine research with professional care to acquire new medical knowledge
only to the extent that clinical research is justified by its therapeutic
value for the patient. 242 Even though the final version stated that nontherapeutic clinical research could not be undertaken without the subject's free and fully informed consent, it allowed the consent of the legal
guardian to be procured in the case of a legal incompetent (without
specifically mentioning children or mental patients). The draft version
also would not allow those children in institutions who were not under
the care of relatives or those persons residing in mental hospitals or in
hospitals for mental defectives to be subjects of human experimentation.
Provisions of the draft version totally deleted from the final version
and without parallel reference are the following:
1) Prisoners of war, military or civilian, should never be used as subjects of
243
experiment;
2) Civilians detatined in any place as a result of military invasion or occupation, or for administrative or political reasons, should never be used for
human experiment; 244 and
3) Persons detained in prisons, penitentiaries, or reformatories-being
"captive groups"-should not be used as subjects of experiment; nor persons incapable of giving consent because of age, mental incapacity, or of
being in a position in which they are incapable of exercising the power of
free choice.
In the period between the draft and final version of the World Medical
Association's code, the British Medical Research Council issued its
Statement on Responsibility in Investigation on Human Subjects to
"serve as a guide to medical men engaged in this kind of work. '245
While many portions of the statement are similar to the codes previously
discussed, certain positions are worth noting. The Council separated investigations on human subjects into two categories-those which contribute to the benefit of the individual and those which contribute to
242 Seep. 1610supra.
243 See notes 301-04 & accompanying text infra.
244 Id.
245 Medical Research Council, Responsibilip in Invesligaions on Human Subecls,

J. 178, 178 (1964).

2 BRrr. MED.
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medical knowledge but are of no direct benefit to the individual. In
those investigations that are beneficial to the individual and in which a
novel procedure is contemplated, the Council believed that the doctor
"may assume the patient's consent to the same extent as he would were
the procedure entirely established practice" and that the "question of
novelty is only relevant to the extent that in reaching a decision to use a
novel procedure the doctor, being unable to fortify his judgment by previous experience, must exercise special care." '246 In a double blind study
where a control might receive no treatment, the control must be fully
advised of this fact and give his fully informed consent. In investigations
of no direct benefit to the individual, fully informed consent must also
be given. In these cases the Council recognized the British view that
such investigations could not be conducted on children under twelve
years of age even with their parents' or guardians' consent. In the case
of the mentally disordered, procedures which carry a risk of harm to the
subject could not be undertaken without fully informed consent.
The Council further stated that:
The head of a department where investigations on human subjects take
place has an inescapable responsibility for ensuring that practice by those
under his direction is irreproachable.
In the same way the Council feels that, as a matter of policy, bodies
like themselves that support medical research should do everything in their
whom they support shall
power to ensure that the practice of all workers
247
be unexceptionable and known to be so.
The Council also believed that specialized scientific societies from
all branches of medicine must create and maintain a body of precedents
which would guide individual investigators. Finally, it asserted that
"any account of investigations on human subjects should make clear
that the appropriate requirements have been fulfilled, and, further, that
no paper should be accepted for publication if there are any doubts that
' 248
such is the case."
Both the Helsinki code and the British statement were well-received
by the medical profession throughout the world, although with some
reservations. While some physicians thought that the deletion in the
Helsinki code of those clauses in the draft versions previously discussed
weakened the code and made it less concise, 249 others thought that there
were acceptable reasons for the deletion and that other clauses compensated for the deletion. 250 There was some discussion that the British
246 Id.
247 Id. at 179.

248 Id. at 180.
249 Ethics of Human Experimentation, 2 BRrr. MED. J. 135, 136 (1964).
250 Ethics of Clinical Research, 2 MED. J. AusTL. 309 (1964).
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statement offered "a more realistic and sounder guide to the research
worker who is enlarging the field of human knowledge by investigating
human beings," 25 ' and the consensus of opinion seemed to be that it at
252
least gave fuller and more detailed guidance than the Helsinki code.
B.

COMPARATIVE ASPECTS OF HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION

At this juncture it is proper to examine the effect of this initial international activity on the regulation of human experimentation in various nations. A significant early effort to communicate the regulatory
practices of various nations was presented in a 1960 international symposium on human experimentation.
In France at this time there was no regulation of surgical intervention and scientific research for a nontherapeutic purpose. However, experimentation was legally permissable only if designed to assist in the
care of the patient without exposing him to a serious and certain danger.
No experimentation was allowed solely for a scientific purpose, devoid of
the idea of treating a sick or healthy person. Even the consent of the
2 53
party concerned was not sufficient to give permission in such a case.
In India, a code of ethics governing human experimentation had
not yet been established. There was no law prohibiting experimentation
on human beings as long as such experiments were not harmful to
health or life. The Indian Council of Medical Research and the Indian
Medical Association had only issued general considerations and broad
principles governing the conduct of such experiments. However, the
Therapeutic Trials Committee of the Indian Council on Medical Research had issued definite instructions concerning therapeutic trials of
drugs conducted under its auspices. "As a rule, at present, inmates of
prisons, mental institutions, etc., are not used as subjects for human experiments nor are patients used for investigations which have no relation
'254
to the condition for which they have been admitted to the hospital.
Although a considerable amount of human experimentation has
been done in Japan, neither the Japanese government nor the Japanese
Medical Association had promulgated a code of ethics governing experiments on human beings, nor was there an institution providing general
guidance for such experiments. However, the Japanese Medical Association endorsed the 1954 resolution of the World Medical Association 255
and recommended that voluntary, informed, written consent, prior
animal experimentation and investigator qualifications be emphasized
251
252
253
254
255

Ethics of Human Experimentation, supra note 249, at 135, 136.
Id. at 136; Ethics of Clinical Research, supra note 250, at 309.
Gosset, Special Report: France, 7 WORLD MED. J. 84 (1960).
Mittra, Special Report: India, 7 WORLD MED. J. 84-85 (1960).
See notes 235-36 & accompanying text sup.ra.
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in any subsequent international code of ethics on human
256
experimentation.
During this period in the Philippines there was apparently very little human experimentation conducted, primarily due to the lack of scientific incentive and the beliefs of the people. Of the experimentation
done on human subjects approximately 90 percent involved the clinical
trial of imported drugs tested on animals and humans in the country of
their origin and 10 percent involved the use of penitentiary inmates.
However, as human experimentation increased in the Philippines, the
necessity for regulation was recognized.257
In Thailand a law existed which regulated medical practice and
also included a code governing the ethics of practitioners, but there was
no specific law or code governing experiments on human beings. The
Medical Association of Thailand had not issued any guidelines on
human experimentation. Physicians were free to use any method of
treatment or any medicine on their patients, so long as it was ethically
thought to benefit the patients and did not defame the medical profession. Controlled therapeutic trials of drugs were practiced only in large
medical centers under the responsibility of the physician concerned, and
the use of inmates of both penal and mental institutions for tontrolled
prophylatic or therapeutic trials was prohibited. Undertaking experiments on patients without relation to the condition for which they were
258
admitted to the hospital were voluntary matters and rarely practiced.
More recently, among some of the member States of the Council of
Europe, a number of principles have emerged in the context of experimentation. For example, in the case of research experiments, the physician is responsible to inform his patients as fully as possible.
Additionally, in cases where there is criticism of treatment without informed consent, only written consent should be accepted in the field of
experimentation. With respect to compensation of subjects injured during experimentation, where the law of contract is applicable on the
grounds of a physician's civil liability in using experimental procedures,
waivers of claims for compensation are not considered valid, unless they
are expressly incorporated into the contract between doctor and patient.
Even then, the waiver is strictly construed in the interest of the patient. 259 Finally, a code of responsibility governing the conduct of physi256 Ono, Special Report: Japan, 7 WORLD MED. J. 85 (1960).

257 Atienza, SpecialRepor, Phiippines, 7 WORLD MED. J. 85 (1960). In 1966, the Philippine
Medical Profession adopted a code of medical ethics which contained a provision that a physician should adhere to the generally accepted principles promulgated by the World Medical
Association. Philippine Medical Association, Code ofMedicalEthicsofthe MedicalProfessionin the
Philippines, 42 J. PHILIPPINES MED. ASS'N 271 (1966).
258 Pholpoke, Special Report: Thailand, 7 WORLD MED. J. 86 (1960).
259 Giesen, supra note 3, at 212-13.
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cian-investigators has recently been enacted in Italy.2 60
In Scandinavian countries no official statistics on the extent of experimentation involving human subjects are available. However, experiments in which violations of human rights were reported have not
occurred, largely because of these countries' reactions to the Nazi medical experimentation in World War II. It is noteworthy that under Danish law there are as yet no general legal rules expressly dealing with
experimentation on human subjects. Moreover, while there is a general
objection to the use of prisoners in experiments, Danish law does not
expressly forbid it.261
French legislation 26 2 also has recently addressed the subject of
human experimentation for pure research. The object of that legislation
is the regulation of medical and biological laboratories. Among the regulations are the requirements of prior authorization for use of experimental products, 263 and the Minister of Health has the right to establish
a list of persons authorized to engage in such research. 264 Authorized
laboratories and personnel and the directors of research also can be held
personally responsible and are subject to inspection by the Ministry of
Health.2 65 These regulations are linked to penal responsibility for injury
caused in the conduct of such experimentation, although it is not expressly prohibited. 266 The Penal Code further prohibits experimentation on persons detained in public institutions. 267 Furthermore, France
enacted a Code of Medical Ethics in 1979268 which provides in Article
19 that biological studies must be preceded by adequate testing before
being applied to human subjects and then only for therapeutic purposes
and at the express request of the patient, provided he knows of its consequences and effects.
In Canada, recent legislation in the Quebec Civil Code has attempted to set standards under which consent may be regarded as properly given. One commentator has stated that while the Quebec statute
has reduced the risk of abuse because of the safeguards surrounding experimentation on minors, the statute is not clear on the lower limit of
260 Codice di Deontologica Medica, Capo VI, art. 48-52, Federazione Nationale Degli
Ordini dei Medici (1978).
261 Larsen, supra note 44, at 170, 175.
262 Law No. 75-626 of July 11, 1975. This statute follows the directives of the European
Economic Community (EEC) on pharmocological and toxicological laboratories and research, as presented in the EEC decision of May 20, 1975.
263 CODE OF PUBLIC HEALTH, art. 601, as amended by an ordinance of Sept. 23, 1976 (to
be issued by the Permanent Biological Comm'n under Article 759 of that Code).
264 Decree No. 75-1024 of Nov. 5, 1975.

265 CODE OF PUBLIC HEALTH, art. 757.
266 PENAL CODE, art. 318.

267 Id. art. 380, para. 3; Decree No. 72-852 of Sept. 12, 1972.
268 Decree No. 79-506 of June 28, 1979.
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consent. Thus, the statute may not cover experiments on children, and
or not Quebec law completely forthe question thus remains whether
2 69
bids experiments on children.
Finally, in both the United Kingdom and Israel there are longstanding practices against allowing prisoners to participate in experiments involving human subjects. 2 70 In fact, outside of the United
using prisoners as volunteer subjects is almost
States, experimentation
271
uniformly forbidden.
In this developing atmosphere of recognition that controls are desirable but that codification of regulations and safeguards is inadequate,
regulation of drug experimentation and human experimentation in general continued to evolve under the FDA and NIH in the United
States.2 72 Also, the British Medical Research Council published its
273
guidelines for investigation on human subjects.
Two other noteworthy statements of professional organizations concerning human experimentation should be mentioned. The first is the
Australian National Health and Medical Research Council's Statement
on Human Experimentation of 1966.274 While this declaration added

no new standards, the mere adoption of such a code in a country with a
medical profession of such a high reputation is an achievement, especially when the code subsequently gained wide acceptance as the official
policy on human experimentation of other grant-giving bodies, hospi269 Bowker, supra note 1, at 173-74. The author also discusses, at 170-71, the case of Halushka v. University of Saskatchewan, (1965), 53 D.L.R. (2d) 436 (Sask. C.A.), in which plaintiff volunteered to take part in the study of a new anaesthetic. While under the anaesthetic,
he suffered a cardiac arrest. He was revived, but the harm to his health was considerable.
Plaintiff had signed a consent form stating that he fully understood what was proposed to be
done. Nevertheless, the jury found that he had not consented to the test that was done and,
inter alia, that the doctors were negligent in failing to fully explain to him the risks involved
with the test at the time of consent. The Court of Appeal held that in research the duty of
explanation is at least as great as, if not greater than, that owed in the traditional doctorpatient relationship. One important problem unresolved by Halushka is that like the Quebec
statute, it does not provide a lower limit in the common law for the age of consent. Bowker,
supra note 1, at 174.
270 Daube, supra note 21, at 10.
271 This finding was based on a survey of seven European nations (Belgium, France, Germany, Holland, Italy, Spain, and Sweden), five English speaking countries (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, South Africa, and the United Kingdom), four Latin American nations
(Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru) and Japan. Jaffe & Snoddy, An InternationalSurvov of
ClinicalResearch in Volunteers, in U.S. NAT'L COMM'N FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, HEW, RESEARCH INVOLVING PRISONERS, supra note 77, at 9-2, 9-4.
272 See notes 119-214 & accompanying text supra.
273 Medical Research Council, supra note 245.
274 Nat'l Health and Medical Research Council, Statement on Human Experimentation, 2 MED.

J.

AUSTL. 325 (1966).
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tals, and research institutions in Australia.2 75
In 1967, a committee established the previous year by the Royal
College of Physicians of London to study supervision of clinical investigation and the best methods for implementation of such supervision
submitted its report.2 76 Although this committee accepted the Helsinki
Code and the Australian Medical Research Council statement as defining the ethical situation and considered that all clinical investigators
should be familiar with these recommendations, it had reservations concerning the ability of the documents to provide more than general guidance or to apply to specific problems. Therefore, the committee
recommended the establishment of a procedure for supervision of
clinical investigation by a peer review group which would separately
2 77
approve each human experimentation project within the institution.
This idea is gaining widespread acceptance, as witnessed by the review
of FDA, NIH and HHS guidelines and the Medical Research Council
statement.
C.

ASSESSMENT OF INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL EFFORTS

A system of enlightened, ethical and parochial review coupled with
fully informed and free consent given by the patient-subject is the most
effective means of conducting clinical investigation while safeguarding
the rights of the patients. However, because of the belief that a responsible, ethical and informed investigator is the one on whom the ultimate
responsibility for the conduct of the experiment and the welfare of the
subject lies, not all of the codes and articles discussed 2 78 recommend
peer review systems and mandatory informed consent of the patientsubject. Yet, the lack of such a peer review system would not contain
the dimension of checks and balances. If a responsible investigator is
always capable of making the "right" decision regarding human experimentation, further control need not be required. But even if nearly all
of the investigators made the ethically correct decision, there would still
remain that small fraction of cases where the patient's rights would be
violated. With a peer review system, more than one viewpoint on a particular experiment can be considered. While one investigator may not
consider all aspects of the situation because of his proximity to the experiment, other medical or scientifically trained individuals and responsible laymen should be able to consider the spectrum of alternatives and
1 MED. J. AusTL 1111, 1112 (1968).
276 Royal College of Physicians, Supervision of the Ethics of ClinicalInvestigationsin Institutions,
3 BRIT. MED. J. 429 (1967).
277 Id. at 429-30.
278 See, e.g., H. BEECHER, supra note 7, at 1360; Beecher, Some Guiding Thn'plesfor Clinical
Investigations, 195 J.A.M.A. 157 (1966); Eperiments in Man, 3 Barr. MED. J. 385, 386 (1967).
275 Morris, Compassion, Caution and Courage,
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recommend a proper course of conduct. If an experiment involving
human subjects is ethical and contains the proper safeguards for the patient, it should withstand scrutiny.
Despite committee consideration of a variety of viewpoints, neither
the committee members nor the investigators undergo the experimental
procedures. Thus, if they decide that a particular experiment should be
conducted on an individual, the fate of that individual is set by nonparticipants. For that reason, the ultimate decision to continue participation in an experiment should reside in the subject. If the subject is to
choose properly, the investigator must fully inform him of all known
information relevant to the experiment and any alternative procedures.
Only then will the subject's voluntary consent be as fully informed as
practicable. Since he may be willing to submit to experimentation not
in accordance with ethical principles, the review committee must still be
able to reject the experiment.
The alternative system of allowing the investigator to make the determination whether an experiment should be done on an individual is
too susceptible to error, no matter how seldom it may occur, because the
potential exists for the investigator's decision to be clouded by his subjectivity to the work and the result he hopes to achieve. He may too
easily forget that the patient-subject deserves greater consideration than
the experiment. Even though medical research is essential, it must not
be done to the unnecessary detriment of the individual. It is too easy for
the investigator to put himself above the subject, as evidenced by the
words of Dr. Southam, who, when questioned as to his reason for injecting patients with live cancer cells but not injecting himself, replied.
I would not have hesitated if it would have served a useful purpose. But to
me it seemed like false heroism, like the old question whether the General
should march behind or in front of his troops. I do not regard myself as
indispensable-if I were not doing this work someone else would be-and I
did not regard the experiment as dangerous. But, let's face it, there are
relatively few2skilled
cancer researchers, and it seemed stupid to take even
79
the little risk.

The investigator must remember that, even though he hopes that the
279 Human Experimentation: The Rights of atients, 1 MED. J. AuSTL 755 (1966). The error in
judgment of which Dr. Southam was guilty in this matter was not the injection of the live
cancer cells into the patients. He was guilty of not fully informing them of all the known
circumstances surrounding the experiment and then obtaining their fully informed voluntary
consent. For this reason, he was found guilty of "unprofessional conduct" and of "fraud and
deceit in the practice of medicine" by a group of his peers and the Regents of the University
of the State of New York and was suspended from practice for one year (although the execution of this suspension was stayed and he was placed on probation and still allowed to practice.) See, e.g., Hyman v. Jewish Chronic Disease Hospital, 21 App. Div. 2d 495, 251 N.Y.S.2d
818 (1964); Halushka v. University of Saskatchewan, (1965), 53 D.L.R. (2d) 436 (Sask. C.A.),
supra note 269.
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experiment will ultimately be for the benefit of mankind, he could not
accomplish this purpose without his subjects. He has no reason, therefore, to place himself above them and to assume risks for them that he
would be reluctant to face himself. This relationship has been accurately summarized: "When research involves human subjects, the research investigator must always remember that in the final analysis
there is no substitute for his volunteer. A person of such importance
should be given the consideration and respect which his unique position
28 0
merits."
After this review of the present internationally accepted or promulgated guidelines for human experimentation, two major questions remain: (1) Is it reasonable to expect patients or healthy individuals to
volunteer as experimental subjects if fully informed? (2) Is it reasonable
to expect nations to cooperate to control or regulate human experimentation? For the answer to the first question, a report of three studies
analyzing the problem of the volunteer in medical research has revealed
the varying willingness of different strata of society in the United States
to participate as volunteers in medical research. 281 The main conclusion
of this report is that patients or healthy individuals will volunteer as
experimental subjects if fully informed. The answer to the second question is also affirmative as evidenced by the cooperation in the develop283
ment of the polio vaccine2 8 2 and the study of rheumatic heart disease.
Based on these and other examples, as well as the aforementioned inter280 Protectionof Huran Rights in Medical Research, 101 CAN. MED. ASS'N J. 237, 238 (1969).
281 Martin, Arnold, Zimmerman & Richart, Human Subjects in Clinical Research-A Report of
Three Studies, 279 NEw ENGLAND J. MED. 1426 (1968).
282 The conquest of poliomyelitis began at the Rockefeller Institute with the discovery of
the polio virus in 1909, followed by the development of the Salk vaccine. This was an attenuated live virus tested under the auspices of the National Foundation for Infantile Paralysis in
1954. Later confirmatory field trials were conducted in the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia
(1960) and in polio epidemics in the United States in the early 1960s. In 1955, Sabin developed an oral polio vaccine in England, which also received comparative trials in several cities
of the United States, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Mexico, and the Belgian Congo. It was also
tested in West Berlin and in other cities of South and Central America. Finally, international
conferences in New Jersey, Moscow, Washington, D.C., and Copenhagen under the auspices
of the World Health Organization and other organizations gathered and evaluated information for the manufacture, distribution and efficacy of the various polio vaccines. Paul, Status
of Vaccination Against Poliomyelitis with ParticularReference to Oral Vaccines, 264 NEW ENGLAND J.
MED. 651, 651-57 (1961).
283 The ongoing cooperative study of rheumatic heart disease is notable among many other
similar efforts to control disease. This study was conducted under the joint sponsorship of the
Medical Research Council of Great Britain and the Council on Rheumatic Fever and Congenital Heart Diseases of the American Heart Association. Densen & Rutstein, NaturalHitogy
of Rheumatlic Fever and Rheumatic Heart Disease: Ten-Year Report of a Cooperative Trial ofACTH,
Cortisone andAspirin, 2 BRIT. MED. J. 607 (1965) reprintedin 93 CAN. MED. Ass'N J. 519 (1965)
and 32 CIRCULATION 457 (1965). See also International Trials and PediatriaticNephrologv, 300
NEW ENGLAND J. MED. 254 (1979) (discussing the success of the International Study of Kidney Disease in Children).

1654

M CHERIFBASSIOUNI ET AL.

[Vol. 72

nationally accepted guidelines and codes, it is clear that nations are prepared to cooperate in the regulation of human experimentation.
VII.

SYNTHESIS AND PROGNOSIS: THE NEED FOR AN
INTERNATIONAL DOCUMENT ON HUMAN
EXPERIMENTATION

Unlawful human experimentation is a single phenomenon which
from the standpoint of the law occurs in two contexts. The first, concerns human experimentation during armed conflict, and the second is
analogous to torture during peacetime. However, torture in time of
peace does not adequately encompass all human experimentation, leaving a need to define the criminal aspects of human experimentation and
thereby complete the symmetry between the law of war and the law of
peace. Moreover, lawful human experimentation implies certain principles, among which is placing the health and welfare of human subjects
foremost. Thus, nations also can declare their adherence to certain
moral principles, following the model of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, 2 4 rather than adopt a system of legally binding prescriptions, on the model of human rights conventions. Besides these areas of human experimentation, there is also a "grey area" which falls
within the potential regulatory schemes of nations. This area is fundamentally a problem of administrative law since penalties would be imposed for violation of administrative rules, for example with respect to
the elements of consent or the conditions of the experiment.
Thus, there is an interrelationship between several areas of the law
on the regulation of human experimentation. The first source is international law as it regulates the conduct of states and imposes certain duties
upon them. The second is the national laws of signatory nations which
should embody the proscriptions of an international convention on this
subject. Finally, there are administrative structures of implementation
which would enforce national law.
The three contexts of human experimentation (the law of war, the
law of peace, and the principled approach) require the elaboration of
separate documents for the purpose of defining the concepts and principles in each area. It is proposed that the first document be a draft convention in the nature of international law conventions. It should
contain (1) the provisions of the Geneva Conventions prohibiting any
type of human experimentation in time of war; (2) an absolute prohibition on human experimentation which would fall within the general nature of crimes against humanity; (3) a prohibition on crimes against
humanity for the purpose of achieving a political objective and used as
284 G.A. Res. 217A(III), 3 U.N. GAOR 71, U.N. Doc. 8/810 (1948).
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an adjunct for torture; 2 5 and (4) a prohibition on human experimentation in prisons, mental institutions and other conditions of detention
where it is conclusively presumed that the individual is incapable of giv2 s6
ing consent.
The second document on crimes against humanity should define
the principles on which human experimentation is lawfully conducted.
Two broad categories would be encompassed by such a document:
(1) experimentation in principle declared to be in violation of human
rights and (2) experiments of therapeutic value but conditioned by
guidelines regarding the subjects and contexts to be applied. The focus
of this proposed document should be on defining the elements of informed consent and ensuring that experimenters obtain it.
Finally, the administrative level document will present guidelines
for national legislation and control mechanisms at the national legislative level, for example institutional peer review committees.
The basis for a specialized convention on human experimentation
285 It has been proposed that unlawful human experimentation be declared a crime punishable under international law. M. BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 85-86
(1980). Article IX of the Draft Code provides:

Section 1. Acts of Unlawfil MedicalExpermentation

1.0 The crime of unlawful medical experimentation consists of any physical and/or
psychological alterations by means of surgical operations or injections, ingestion or inhalation of substances inflicted by or at the instigation of a public official, or for which a
public official is responsible and to which the person subject to such experiment does not
grant consent as described in Section 2.
Section 2.

Defense of Consent

2.1 For the purpose of this Article a person shall not be deemed to have consented to
medical experimentation unless he or she has the capacity to consent and does so freely
after being fully informed of the nature of the experiment and its possible consequences.
2.2 A person may withdraw his or her consent at any time and shall be deemed to have
done so if he or she is not kept fully informed within a reasonable time of the progress of
the experiment and any development concerning its possible consequences.
Id. at 85.
286 United States law has sought to achieve patient rights which embody the concept that
a patient be capable of giving his informed consent. That view is a necessary precondition to
any argument favoring a confined individual's right to accept or refuse treatment. See R.
SCHWITZGEBEL, LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE ENFORCED TREATMENT OF OFFENDERS (HEW
Pub. No. (ADM) 79-831, 1979). See also notes 98-113 & accompanying text supra. However,

since legal systems throughout the world fail to afford a similar degree of protection to human
subjects, the opportunities for abuse are rampant. Consequently, it is proposed that any
scheme for international regulation include a prohibiton against experimentation on categories of persons shown in practice to be readily misled or coerced into participating in unlawful
experiments. By presuming them incapable of giving informed consent, they would enjoy
greater protection by virtue of their status as inmates of detentional or domiciliary institutions.
See generally U.S. NAT'L COMM'N FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, HEW RESEARCH INVOLVING CHILDREN, supra
note 75, at 21-26; U.S. NAT'L COMM'N FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, HEW, RESEARCH INVOLVING PRISONERS, sura
note 77; H. BEECHER, supra note 7, at 52-78; C. FRIED, supra note 15, at 61-63; Daube, supra
note 21, at 10.

1656

M. CHERIFBASSO UNI ET AL.

[Vol. 72

is provided primarily by the international documents on human rights.
The proliferation of those documents since World War II is evidence of
the desire among nations to promote human rights in a widening variety
of contexts. A convention for the protection of human subjects would be
consonant with the attitude of the world community by guaranteeing
additional rights heretofore implicit in many such documents but not
yet singled out. 28 7 This current lack of specificity gives rise to certain
problems especially with respect to the nature and extent of the duty of
States to protect experimental subjects and the scope of the situations in
which human rights guarantees may be invoked. A survey of the existing documents reveals the doctrinal basis which justifies a specialized
convention and the lack of specificity which necessitates it.
The starting point for analysis of international instruments dealing
with human rights is the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of
1948.288 Many of its provisions are now recognized as declaratory of
customary international law, and therefore as binding on all States.
Several States have also accepted the Declaration as binding.28 9 This
document has been invoked as law on many occasions and by juridical
consensus has become the authentic interpretation of the human rights
provisions of the United Nations Charter. 290 Still, the Declaration is
perceived as the seminal force which creates new human rights instruments rather than specifying such rights. Thus, the Universal Declaration lacks the specificity necessary to provide the linkage to human
experimentation. Moreover, it is vulnerable to the argument that because it is not a treaty, it may not afford adequate protection to experi287 Given the fact that the impetus for the human rights movement was in large measure
due to the physical and spiritual devastation of World War II and that the war crimes convictions for unlawful human experimentation have never been challenged as deficient under
international law, it is ironic that a convention for the regulation of human experimentation
does not yet exist. See generally L. HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAvE 229-37 (1979).
288 See note 284 supra.
289 Higgins, Conceptual Thinking About the Individual h InternationalLaw, 24 N.Y.L. SCH. L.
REV. 11, 22 (1978); Humphrey, The Implementation ofIntemationalHumanRights Law, 24 N.Y.L.
SCH. L. REV. 31, 32-33 (1978); van Dijk, InternationalLaw and the Promotion and Protection of
Human Rights, 24 WAYNE L. REv. 1529, 1543 (1978). See generally Lillich, The Role ofDomestic
Courts in PromotingInternationalHuman Rights Norms, 24 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 153 (1978).
290 Humphrey, supra note 289, at 33. The Charter of the United Nations refers to
problems of human rights in its Preamble and in six separate Articles. However, it does not
specifically enumerate any of these rights. This task has been left to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other conventions. See UNITED NATIONS ACTION IN THE FIELD
OF HUMAN RIGHTs 6 (1980) [hereinafter referred to as ACTION]. It is generally agreed, however, that the Charter imposes obligations on States to respect human rights. The possibility
of coercive sanctions are precluded by Article II except where the violations are so serious as
to pose a threat to international peace or security. Moreover, the advisory opinions which
may be requested on legal matters under Article 96 are open to political influence which
detract from justice and consistency. Humphrey, supra note 289, at 34-37.
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mental human subjects.2 9'
The Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which springs from the
Universal Declaration by expressly dealing with matters implicit
therein, 292 prohibits human experimentation without the free consent of
the subject. 293 However, the Covenant is hobbled by weak implementa294

tion provisions.
Likewise, the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedom is an outgrowth of the Universal
Declaration and provides the same basic rights as the Convention on
Civil and Political Rights. Although the enforcement mechanisms of
the European Convention are relatively strong, 295 any State party to the
291 See STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, Art. 38(l). See also van
Dijk, supra note 289, at 1541-43.
292 G.A. Res. 2200 A, 21 U.N. GOAR Supp. (No. 16) 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16,

1966) [hereinafter referred to as G.A. Res. 2200A].
293 Among the prohibitions specifically mentioned in the Covenant are ones against arbitrary deprivation of life, torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, slavery and forced labor, and arbitrary arrest and detention. Equal treatment of persons before
the courts is guaranteed, and retrospective penal legislation is prohibited. Moreover, freedom
of thought, conscience and religion are provided for, as are freedom of speech, assembly and
association. G.A. Res. 2200 A, supra note 292, arts. 6, 7, 8, 9, 14, 15, 18, 19(2), 21, 22.
294 The Covenant provides for implementation at both the national and international
levels. Id., arts. 2(1), 28-45. Implementation at the national level has been criticized on the
ground that Article 2 allows for States to postpone implementation by delaying the passage of
legislation, as required by the Covenant under Article 2, which would assure the rights defined. The provisions for international implementation, contained in Articles 28-45, provide
for creation of a human rights committee. Its functions are to deal with reports from States
parties and to consider complaints by one State that another has not fulfilled its obligations.
This procedure has been criticized as highly complicated and subject to long delays. In addition, neither the Human Rights Committee nor a Conciliation Commission, both of which
are established by the Covenant, is empowered to make judicial determination. G.A. Res.
2200 A, supra note 292, arts. 41-42. See Humphrey, supra note 289, at 38-42. See generalfy
Schwelb, The InternationalMeasures ofImplementation of the InternationalCovenant on Civil and Political Rights and of the OptionalProtocol, 12 Tx. INT'L L.J. 141 (1977).
Regulation of experimentation could also be sought through the Optional Protocol to
the Covenant, G.A. Res. 2200 A, supra note 292, arts. 1-2. A State party to the Covenant that
is also a party to the Protocol recognizes the competence of the Human Rights Committee to
receive and consider complaints from individuals who claim to be victims of violations by
that State. However, the Committee is only permitted to forward its views to the State and
the individual. Id. arts. 1-5. The Optional Protocol has been attacked on the grounds of
providing a feeble enforcement mechanism and for failing to provide any means whereby
third parties may bring complaints on behalf of individuals unable to bring them themselves.
See Humphrey, supra note 289, at 44-48. Moreover, it is unlikely that creation of a new
optional protocol will attract many adherents. See Bassiouni The Prevention and Suppression of
Torture, supra note 33, at 108. See also Commission on Human Rights Draft Convention
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/1367 (1980), rei'ntedin 19 INT'L LEcis. MATERIALS 647.
295 European Convention, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (Nov. 4, 1950) [hereinafter cited as 213
U.N.T.S. 221]. This Convention is regarded by some commentators as the most effective
system yet created for the protection of human rights. Its great merit is that the individual is
granted access to an international organ which can investigate his complaint, provided that
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Convention may free itself from its obligations and from the decisions of
the judicial bodies established thereunder 296 by withdrawing from the
2 97
Council of Europe and denouncing the Convention.
the State concerned has subscribed to the "right of individual petition" and that before this
right can be exercised, the individual must have exhausted local remedies. Id. art. 19. See D.
PONCET, LA PROTECTION DE L'AcCUSE PAR LA CONVENTION EUROPEANNE DES DRorrS DE
L'HOMME (1977); A. ROBERTSON, HUMAN RIGHTS IN EUROPE (1977); Humphrey, supra note

289, at 49; Robertson, Human Rights.- A Global Assessment, 53 NOTRE DAME LAw. 14, 23-24
(1977). One commentator has argued that the European Convention is gradually becoming
integrated into the law of the member states of the European Community. Drzemczewski,
The Domestic Application of the European Human Rights Convention as European Community Law, 30
INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 118 (1981). The effect of this development may be that the Convention
will acquire persuasive force within the domestic courts of the member states, including those
that have not "formally incorporated" it into their domestic law, when certain issues of European Community Law arise. Id. at 119. This does not necessarily mean, however, that a
citizen of a member state has a remedy in that state's domestic courts for violations of the
Convention by member states. Id. at 134-35.
296 At the international level, implementation is achieved primarily by two organs: the
European Commission of Human Rights and a European Court of Human Rights. The
Commission is essentially a conciliatory body, but it may also state its opinion that the facts
disclosed to it reveal a violation of human rights on the part of a State party. Moreover, mere
ratification of the Convention exposes a signatory to the possibility that another State will
accuse it of a breach before the Commission. 213 U.N.T.S. 221, supra note 295, art. 24. See
Humphrey, supra note 289, at 49.
297 The Greek government chose this course in 1967 and thereby opted out of its commitments regardless of the circumstances or the opinion of the world community when three
Scandinavian governments and the Netherlands brought charges against the Greeks for violations of ten articles of the Convention. Had the Greeks not resigned and denounced the
Conventions, they would have been expelled for their human rights violations. With the
return of democracy, Greece ratified the Convention and was readmitted to the Council.
Robertson, supra note 295, at 23.
For an analogy with the problems of torture and their implementation within the European Convention on Human Rights, see The Greek Case, [1972] Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON
HUMAN RIGHTS 186 (Eur. Comm. on Human Rights); Tyrer v. U.K., Application No.
5856/72, Report of the European Commission of Human Rights, 14 Dec. 1976; Requests No.
3321/67, 3323/67 et 3344/67, treated jointly in "L'Afaire Grecque," Strasbourg (1970).
These cases are abstracted in an Amnesty International publication TORTURE IN GREECE:
THE FIRST FOUR TORTURERS' TRIAL 1975 (1977). See also COUNCIL OF EUROPE, CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS-CASE LAw TOPICS--HUMAN RIGHTS IN

PRISONS 14 (1971); Ireland v. United Kingdom, 41 Collection of Decisions 3 (1972) (Eur.
Comm. on Human Rights); Report of the Committee of Privy Counsellors (Cmnol. 4901),
minority report of Lord Gardiner, Right of Sef-Determination in InternationalLaw, 8 REV. INT'L
COMM'N JURISTS 44, 47 (1972). See also 28 U.S.C. § 1350 which grants United States District
Courts original jurisdiction in "any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in
violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States." See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,
630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (permitting alien to sue agent of foreign government for torture);
see also Rosado v. Civiletti, 621 F.2d 1179 (2d Cir. 1980) (describing practice of torture of
persons under interrogation by Mexican police).
A potential difficulty in the European Conventions is that notified derogation is permitted in conditions of national emergency of such magnitude as to threaten the survival of the
nation. 213 U.N.T.S. 221, supra note 295, art. 15, 213 U.N.T.S. at 232. While such a provision may be desirable in order to accommodate the needs of a State to perform its public
duties for the common good, it is undesirable in the context of human experimentation since
no reasonable need of the State could be served by suspension of such basic protective meas-
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In the Western Hemisphere the leading human rights document is
the American Convention on Human Rights. 298 Although influenced
by the European Convention, the former differs with respect to important features such as the definition of rights and procedures for implementation. 29 9 However, the American Convention cannot be relied
upon to enforce human rights because regional conventions on a worldwide scale demonstrate the lack of shared values and differences in legal
systems among nations.3 00 In this respect regional conventions are too
insufficiently specialized as to the human rights which they define and
protect.
The Four Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949,301 provide the
basic protection against unlawful human experimentation during war.
The main thrust of these Conventions is to establish a humanitarian law
of armed conflict which aims at protection of noncombatant military
personnel and civilians who do not participate in the hostilities. Although the Geneva Conventions are primarily applicable to armed conflict,30 2 provisions in each Convention expressly forbid the use of either
protected military personnel or civilians for biological experimentation.3 03 Moreover, common article 3, which protects persons taking no
active part in either international or non-international armed conflict,
requires that all such persons be treated humanely. To this end, cruel,
humiliating or degrading treatment is expressly prohibited. If such violations occur in the non-international context, the International Comures as informed consent and peer review. Were such action taken, it is doubtful whether the
common good would be served at all. See Higgins, DEROGATIONS UNDER HUMAN RIGHTS
TREATIES, 1977 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 281, 288-315.
298 O.A.S. Official Records OEA/Ser. K/XVI/1.1, Doc. 65, Rev. 1, Corr. 1 (Jan. 7, 1970),
reprintedin 9 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 99 (1970).
299 One important difference is that the American Convention grants a right to persons,
groups and non-governmental organizations to lodge petitions with the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights on behalf of others whose rights are allegedly violated. Id. arts. 44,
45. Thus, States which ratify the Convention become vulnerable to disputes with other States
only if they expressly recognize the competence of the Commission to hear State applications.
Humphrey, sufira note 289, at 51-52. An Inter-American Court of Human Rights is also to be
established, to which, however, individuals and organizations will not have access. American
Convention, art. 61.
300 Lopez-Rey, Crime and Human Rights, 42 FED. PROB. 10, 12 (1978).
301 Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed
Forces of the Field, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of
Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, .75 U.N.T.S. 85; Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Convention Relative to
the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
302 See Gulbrandsen, ,4 Commentagi on the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, sutra note 5, at 368.
303 See generaloyJ. PICTET, HUMANrrARIAN LAw AND THE PROTECTION OF WAR VIcrrIMS
(1975); I COMMENTARY: THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST, 1949, 370-72 (Pictet
ed. 1952).
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mittee of the Red Cross informs the party involved of the breaches
committed and enjoins it to terminate such experiments. Violations
which take place in this context constitute grave breaches of Article 50,
of the First Convention, Article 51 of the Second Convention, Article
130 of the Third Convention and Article 147 of the Fourth Convention
which prohibit inter alia biological experiments. For grave breaches the
signatories are required to enact penal sanctions through domestic legislation. Article 12 of the First and Second Conventions, 12 of the Third,
and 16, 27 and 32 of the Fourth provide that protected persons be
treated humanely and in particular that they not be subject to ill treatment, biological, medical or scientific experiments regardless of their
state of health, age or sex.
Of the 1977 Draft Additional Protocols Amending the Geneva
Conventions of August 12, 1949, Protocols I and II provide protection
for the investigator and further protections for the subjects. Article 11 of
Protocol I prohibits medical or scientific experiments on protected persons even with their consent. Article 16(2) of Protocols I and II provide
that medical personnel not be compelled to perform nor to refrain from
performing medical activities "required by the rules of medical ethics."
Article 12(1)-(2) of Protocol II provides that protected persons shall not
be subjected to any medical procedure, particularly a medical or scientific experiment, which is not necessary for their health or which is contrary to accepted medical standards.
The Geneva Conventions and Protocols shift legal emphasis from
military necessity to humanitarian considerations. 30 4 Unethical experimentation on human subjects committed during armed conflict is
clearly criminalized. Consequently, the interests of the individual assume great significance, and these interests supply the principles which
should be adopted for the regulation of human experimentation relating
to the context of peace.
Like the Geneva Conventions, the Crimes Against Humanity as defined by the Nuremberg Tribunal3 0 5 are related to the context of war,
304 van Dijk, supra note 289, at 1537.
305 Crimes Against Humanity are defined in Art. 6 of the Charter of the International
Military Tribunal, annexed to the Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the
Major War Criminals of the European Axis, signed on August 8, 1945. 82 U.N.T.S. 279.
These crimes include murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation and other acts of inhumanity committed against any civilian population, before or during World War II, or
persecutions for political, racial, or religious reasons in execution of or connection with any
crime within the jurisdiction of the Nuremberg Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the
domestic law of the country where the crime was perpetrated. See INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, XXII TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNA-

TIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL 496 (1947). On November 21, 1947, by Resolution 177 (I), the

U.N. General Assembly directed the International Law Commission to enumerate the Principles of Nuremberg and to prepare a draft code of offenses against the peace and security of
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and while elevating the interests of individuals above those of the military during armed conflict, the focus is on protection of whole populations rather than individuals.
Support for a specialized convention for protection of human subjects in peacetime is found in the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. 30 6 Although widely criticized as
ineffectual despite ratification by the vast majority of countries, 30 7 the
Genocide Convention nevertheless protects certain groups of people
rather than individuals. 30 8 Genocide is defined as an international
crime whether it is committed in time of war or peace (Article I). In
particular, genocide is committed by any individual who causes bodily
or mental harm to members of a national, ethnic, racial or religious
group or by anyone who imposes measures intended to prevent births
within such groups. 30 9 Although it is reasonable to include unethical
human experimentation among the criminal acts prohibited by these
articles, the Genocide Convention is not sufficiently specific to adequately protect all human subjects. While the Convention would prohibit unethical experiments on protected groups, it would not safeguard
against individual instances. 3 10 Therefore, even if the Genocide Convention does bar such experimentation, the scope of its protection is too
narrow.
Finally, some support for a specialized convention is found in the
Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners and Related
Recommendations. 3 1' The Rules set forth standards for adequate medimankind which incorporated those principles. For the history of the resolutions, see The
Charter and Judgment of the Nuremberg Tribunal: History and Analysis, U.N. Doc. A/ON
4/5, at 11-33. Tornaritis, The Individualas a Subject ofInternationalLaw andInternationalCriminal
Responsibiliy, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW supra note 5, at 103, 110-11; Bassiouni, InternationalLaw and the Holocaust, 9 CAL. W. J. INT'L L. 201 (1979).

U.N. GAOR Res. 96 (1), G.A. Res. 260 A (III), 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (Dec. 9, 1948).
Lopez-Rey, supra note 307, at 12. Seegenerally P. DRosT, THE CRIME OF STATE 119-36
(1959).
308 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (1948). Article II defines the protected groups:
In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed
with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group,
as such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about
its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
309 Id.
310 The scope of the Genocide Convention is not restricted to crimes committed in time of
war. It is, therefore, part of the law of peace. Bassiouni, Genocide and RacialDisrimination in
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAw, supra note 5, at 523; Woetzel, War Crimes by Irregular and
Nongovemmental Forces, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAw suira note 5, at 413.
311 E.S.C. Res. 663 C (XXIV), 31 July 1957. See also Note by the Secretary-General, The
306
307
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cal care of prisoners, but are silent as to the use of prisoners as experimental subjects. Moreover, the Rules were passed as a U.N. resolution
and consequently are only recommendatory.3 12 However, the Rules
seek to advance the principle of asserting individual interests over those
of prison authorities who may be unduly oppressive in their efforts to
maintain order.
In summary, the existing legal environment defined by international human rights instruments provides a substantial basis for including experimentation within the human rights movement, but this
framework is at present inadequate to meet the task of clearly defining
the rights of subjects and the duties of investigators and states.
Additional support for a specialized convention can be drawn from
consideration of customary international law and from general principles. The two documents which provide the strongest evidence for the
existence of custom 3 13 are the Articles of the Nuremberg Tribunal and
the Code of Ethics on Human Experimentation of the World Medical
Association.3 14 However, asserting the need for a convention may also
imply that the essential elements of customary law-repeated usage and
belief that a legal obligation has been fulfilled3 l5 -may be lacking.
Even if they are present, this general test is vague.3 16 Adoption of a
convention would mean removal of such ambiguities by creating clearly
recognizable rights and unmistakably binding duties. Reliance upon
general principles3 17 is useful only to the extent that they are indicative
of a legal policy or principle prevalent in all or most national legal sysRange of Application and the Implementation of the Standard Minimum Rules for the
Treatment of Prisoners, U.N. General Assembly Provisional Agenda, Item 6, E/AC. 57/28,
24 May, 1976; Analytical Summary by the Secretary-General, Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment in Relation to Detention and Imprisonment,
U.N. General Assembly Provisional Agenda, Item 75, A/10158, 23 July, 1975.
312 J. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 380-96, 413-32 (1963); I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES
OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 14, 696 (1979).

313 Two elements are required in order for custom to be considered a source of law. The
first is a concrete element consisting of a repetition of action, sometimes called "usus". The
second element is psychological in the sense that the repetitive action must be performed with
the conviction that such performance fulfills a legal obligation or exercises a legal right, van
Dijk, supra note 289, at 1541-43.
314 See notes 52-66 & accompanying text supra.
315 However, a convention may itself generate customary law, as did several of the conventions cited as to non-parties at Nuremberg. See generaly A. D'AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF
CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1971).
316 J. BRIERLY, supra note 312, at 61.

317 General principles of international law refers to those principles which are found in all
or most national legal systems and are therefore recognized by civilized nations. However,
the term "civilized nations" is now regarded as obsolete since membership in the United
Nations is universal and the notion that only certain States have monopolized civilization has
been deflated. van Dijk, supra note 289, at 1544-46.
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tems. 3 18 Accordingly, recourse to general principles leaves the issue of
specificity unresolved. In short, the difficulty with both customary law
and general principles is that neither is viewed as providing a sufficiently specific and binding source of law as compared to conventions.
National legal systems could also be considered as the exclusive
measures for regulation of human experimentation. However, effective
means of implementing these goals vary widely despite the recognition
3 19
by most States that such achievement is desirable.
Besides the doctrinal foundation provided by the aforementioned
sources of law, compelling policy reasons justify a specialized convention. These policies can be summarized as follows:
1. A convention would provide a clear and acceptable definition of experimentation which is sufficiently broad in scope to protect all
human subjects.
2. It would apply to all contexts of human experimentation and extend
universally to all States.
3. Individuals would be held accountable for violations, thereby avoiding conflict among the States.
4. A credible threat of punishment would be created by declaring certain acts to be international crimes.
5. A duty would be created on all signatory States to prosecute or
extradite.
6. Maximum international attention would be focused on a State for
refusal to carry out its obligations.
7. A convention would provide a modicum of international implementation through use of existing enforcement mechanisms.
8. It would reinforce and strengthen the resolve and ability of individuals and States attempting to secure greater protection of human subjects without placing unreasonable duties on them or causing undue
embarrassment to States willing to comply with the convention.
9. The scientific community would continue to enjoy adequate protection while those of subjects would be increased.
10. A convention would provide more extensive control than is provided
by municipal legal systems alone.
Reasons of policy strongly favor protection of human subjects
through international law, and a specialized convention offers the most
effective approach.3 2 0 Human experimentation must be singled out be318 J. BRIERLY, ura note 312, at 63; I. BROWNLIE, supira note 312, at 15-19. For a discussion of the role of international conventions (especially the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights) in codifying certain general principles of the world's legal systems and
therefore as binding states which have not ratified those instruments, see Havener & Mosher,
General Pn'nciples of Law and the UN Covenant on Civil and PoliticalRights, 27 INT'L & COMP.

L.Q. 596 (1978).
319 See THE PREVENTION AND SUPPRESSION OF TORTURE, supira note

33, at 107.

320 There is ample precedent for this approach as evidenced by the following international

instruments:
1.

1948 Genocide Convention
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cause the reinforcement of general human rights prescriptions will not
lead to the protection of human subjects. The basic elements of such an
approach are, first, to strengthen the effectiveness of national control
systems. These systems should then be supported by an international
obligation to carry out those controls. The expectation that such a system will be acceptable to the world community is based on extensive
international cooperation in scientific endeavors3 2 1 and the relatively in3 22
sensitive political nature of human experimentation.
323
Although violations of human rights continue to be widespread
3
24
and are a source of discouragement to human rights advocates, there
is evidence of increasing acceptance by governments, nongovernmental
organizations and individuals of the obligation to respect human
rights. 325 Grimly conscious that the atrocities of World War II are a
threat to the peace and security of all, the states of the world must acknowledge the practicality inherent in the development of the human
rights movement. A convention which singles out human experimentation and the rights of research subjects as a specific area for protection is
appropriately intended as part of this program.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

By the end of World War II when the London Charter of August 8,
1945,326 was agreed upon for the prosecution of major war criminals, the
framework for such prosecutions was defined within the parameters of
the laws of war, namely war crimes. The laws of war were at that time
2. 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs
3. 1972 Amending Protocol to the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs
4. 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances
5. Four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949
6. 1973 Draft Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions
7. 1963 Tokyo, 1970 Hague, and 1971 Montreal Conventions on Aircraft Hijacking
8. 1973 Convention on Kidnapping of Diplomatic Personnel.
See Bassiouni, supra note 90, at 423. Dinstein, supra note 81, at 166-67.
321 See notes 282-83 & accompanying text supra.
322 Compare, for example, the numerous United Nations resolutions of the General Assembly, Security Council and other organs condemning the policies of apartheid with its pronounced political overtones. See ACTION, supra note 290, at 41-46. There are also strong
political elements with respect to the abolition of torture since it, like apartheid, is practiced
as government policy. See Bassiouni, The Prevention and Suppression of Torture, supra note 33, at
106-07.
323 See Robertson, Human Rights supra note 295, at 15-17; Lopez-Rey, supra note 300, at 12.
324 See van Dijk, supra note 289, at 1552-53.
325 See Higgins, supra note 289, at 12-13; Humphrey, supra note 289, at 60-61; van Dijk,
supra note 289, at 1552-53; Robertson, Human Rights supra note 295, at 32. See also Rodley,
MonitoringHuman Rights by the UN System and NongovernmentalOrganizations in HUMAN RIGHTS
AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY (D. Kommers & G. Loescher eds. 1979).

326 Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the
European Axis, 8 August 1945, 82 U.N.T.S. 279.
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defined in the Hague Conventions of 1907,327 which codified the customary laws of war and the Geneva Convention of 1864,328 as amended
in 1929.329 Crimes against humanity were new crimes which, though
related to war, had at that time no substantive legal basis. The Nuremberg prosecutions and judgments confirmed the separateness of war
crimes and crimes against humanity, though the acts falling under the
two definitions created an overlap. Thus human experimentation, if
conducted against prisoners of war and civilian populations under military occupation, would be a war crime, while such experiments on a
state's own population would be a crime against humanity, provided,
however, that they are performed in the context of war.
The General Assembly's Declaration on the Principles of the Nuremberg Charter and Judgment 330 restated the essence of the Nuremberg indictments, trials and judgments in the form of concise principles
in order that they would serve as a reliable and ascertainable historical
precedent. Nevertheless, the resolution maintains the distinction necessitated by the manner in which the London Charter set forth the
charges of the prosecution and, consequently, conditioned the outcome.
It is, therefore, clear that the General Assembly principles create the
same overlap and leave the same gap that exists under the Nuremberg
trials. To bridge that gap between the law of war and the law of peace
and to ensure the application of international criminal law to certain
abhorrent acts which shock the universal conscience, the Genocide Convention was elaborated. It prohibits the use of unlawful human experimentation but only in the context of genocide. Only the wholesale use
of human subjects for experimental purposes performed with the intent
to exterminate a given people is encompassed therein.
327 Hague Conventions of 18 October 1907:

No. III, Relative to the Opening of Hostilities, 3

MARTENS

NOUVEAU

RECUEIL

(3rd)

437.

No. IV, Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 3 MARTENS NOUVEAU
RECUEIL (3rd) 341.
Annex to Hague Convention No. IV of 18 October 1907, embodying the Regulations
Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 2 SCoTT, HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCE 376.
No. V, Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in Case of War
on Land, 3 MARTENS NouvEAu RECUEIL (3rd) 504.
No. IX, Concerning Bombardment by Naval Forces in Time of War, 3 MARTENS
NOUVEAU RECUEIL (3rd) 604.
No. X, for the Adaptation to Maritime Warfare of the Principles of the Geneva Convention, 3 MARTENS NOUVEAU RECUEIL (3rd) 630.
328 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Sick and Wounded of
Armies in the Field, 22 August 1864, 18 MARTENS NOUVEAU RECUEIL DES TRArrEs (Ist)
607.
329 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in
Armies in the Field, 27 July 1929, 118 L.N.T.S. 303.
330 Report of the International Law Commission, 5 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 12) 11-14
U.N. Doc. A/1316 (1950).
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Subsequent to 1948, human rights conventions have proscribed
cruel, unusual and degrading treatment and punishment, but have not
dealt specifically with the issue of human experimentation (except for
Article 7 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights), even though it
presumably could be deemed to fall within the scope of the proscriptions
referred to above. In addition, the concept of unlawful human experimentation re-enters the law of peace by analogy to the prohibitions
against torture, except that experiments could be privately performed
and not be for the purpose of obtaining a statement. There is, however,
no clear definition of what unlawful human experimentation means or
encompasses. Nor it there any specific requirement that States ensure
against such practices by effective means of prevention and suppression.
One may confidently conclude that the laws of war under the Geneva Conventions prohibit human experimentation but lack adequate
definition. The general principle of "crimes against humanity," which
could also be labelled a customary principle, encompasses these acts,
provided they are war-related, but does so without any definition or
specificity as to the content of the prohibition. Moreover, the Genocide
Convention limits its content. Finally, the human rights covenants generally encompass human experimentation only within the broad meaning of cruel, unusual and degrading treatment and punishment, but this
is done without definitional content and without considering the implementation of criminal sanctions or administrative mechanisms against
such acts. It is apparent, therefore, that the elaboration of three documents is warranted: (1) an international convention for the prevention
and suppression of unlawful human experimentation; (2) a set of draft
principles for the international regulation of human experimentation;
and (3) guidelines for national legislation concerning human experimentation. 33 1 Their mission is to define human experimentation, the
parameters of its lawfulness, and the nature of unlawful acts. The obligation of states to regulate their activities in order to prevent and suppress unlawful conduct and to express the universal human concern
with a category of activities whose potential for abuse is revealed by
history and the uncertainties of modern medical science and technology
is uncontestable. Although no abuses have been committed by any
state which are comparable to those of World War II, such regulation
would truly be preventive and, thus, fulfill one of the long sought-after
yet seldom attained goals of law in general and of international law in
particular.
331 An international regulatory scheme comprised of three such documents was recently
proposed following discussions among an international committee of experts sponsored by the
International Institute for Higher Studies in Criminal Sciences, Siracusa, Sicily, from May 24
to June 1, 1980. See Iude Ghziale, 51 REVUE INT'IE DE DROIT PANAL 357 (1981).

